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INTRODUCTION 
There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its com­
petitor.1 For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million 
worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operat­
ing systems market.2 Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the 
nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14%3 of the common stock of 
Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest grow­
ing) airline.4 Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, 
serving 3.6 million passengers per year.5 In another example, TCI, the 
nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% 
1 .  Passive investment refers to a situation in which the investing firm does not seek to 
gain influence over the competitor's activities or to access the competitor's sensitive infor­
mation. 
2. John Markoff, Microsoft Comes to the Aid of a Struggling Apple, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
1997, at Al. It should be noted that, despite Apple's difficulties and small market share, it 
was on the route to recovery and growth. Steve Jobs, Apple's co-founder, returned to have 
an active role in running the company and introduced a new strong board with top managers 
from the computer industry, including Lawrence Ellison, the chairman of the Oracle Corpo­
ration and an old enemy of Microsoft. In addition, Apple was developing a new and prom­
ising operating system and hardware manufacturers introduced upgrades for use with Ap­
ple's Macintosh computers. Robert X. Cringelys, Apple's Worst Enemy No More, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1997, at A31; Steve Lohr, Jobs's Team and Name Are on the Line, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1997, at Dl; Shares of Apple Computer Rise Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 
1998, at Dll. In this light, it is plausible to view Apple as one of Microsoft's potentially vi­
able competitors. Accordingly, investment by Microsoft in Apple, as shown in this Article, 
might be explained by anticompetitive strategic motivations. 
3. Although the stock acquisition was originally meant to grant Northwest a controlling 
interest, Northwest later agreed to place the stock in a voting trust for ten years following 
the acquisition. This arrangement allegedly limited Northwest's voting power to matters 
such as the approval of a merger with a third firm. To settle an antitrust suit filed by the De­
partment of Justice, Northwest recently agreed to sell back to Continental nearly one-half of 
its stake in that airline, leaving Northwest with 7% of the outstanding shares of Continental. 
Nonetheless, Northwest retained limited veto privileges, giving it the power to block any 
merger or change of control involving Continental and another airline. 
Laurence Zuckerman, 2 Airlines Make Deal in Attempt to End Their Antitrust Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at Cl; see infra note 9. 
4. Laura Goldberg, Airlines Proceed with Alliance, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 21, 1998, at 
Al; Frank Swoboda, Airlines Complete Deal Despite Suit; Northwest, Continental in 'Virtual 
Merger,' WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1998, at Gl; Bob von Sternberg, The NWA-Continental 
Deal; It's Not All Smooth Flying for Deal; Continental, NW A alliance likely to mean higher 
fares, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 27, 1998, at lD; Dean Yellin, Northwest, Conti­
nental Forge Alliance; $519m Deal Would Link Routes, REC. (Bergen County, N.J.), Jan. 27, 
1998, at Bl. As mentioned above, Northwest recently reduced its stake in Continental to 7% 
of shares outstanding. Zuckerman, supra note· 3. 
5. These include the routes from Newark to Detroit, from Minneapolis to New York 
and Cleveland, and from Houston to Detroit, Memphis and Minneapolis, among others. Al­
though the stock acquisition would have a relatively modest effect on the overall market, it 
has raised great concerns with regard to competition and airfares in these markets due to the 
small number of airlines serving them. See, e.g. , David Ivanovich, GAO Sees Flaws in Alli­
ance; Report: Continental-Northwest Not Good for All, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1999, at 1 
(Business); Justice v. Northwest; Continental alliance deserves scrutiny, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Dec. 6, 1998, at 32A. 
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stake (which can be increased, under the terms of a settlement with 
the Federal Trade Commission, to a 14.99% stake) in Time Warner, 
the nation's second-largest cable operator.6 Gillette, the international 
and U.S. leader in the wet-shaving razor blade market acquired, as a 
passive investment, 22.9% of the nonvoting stock and approximately 
13.6% of the debt of Wilkinson Sword, one of its largest competitors.7 
There are also several cases in which one firm's controlling share­
holder invests in the firm's competitor. A striking example existed, for 
several years, in the car rental industry: National Car Rental's con­
troller, General Motors ("GM"), acquired a 25% stake of Avis, Na­
tional's competitor. In the very same industry, Hertz's controller, 
Ford, had acquired $324 million worth of Budget's nonvoting stock.8 
6. This occurred pursuant to the merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time 
Warner. Time Warner and TCI together reach nearly half of America's cable households. 
Mark Landler, Turner to Merge into Time Warner; a $7.5 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
1995, at Al; Misgivings Over a Media Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at A26. TCI's pas­
sive stake in Time Warner was approved by the Federal Trade Commission. Time Warner, 
Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. 50,301 (Sept. 25, 1996). This transaction will be further discussed infra Sec­
tion 11.C. 
7. United States v. Gillette Co., 55 Fed. Reg. 28,312 (July 10, 1990). Gillette's passive 
stake in Wilkinson Sword was approved by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. 
See infra text accompanying notes 94-97. 
8. See Devavrat Purohit & Richard Staelin, Rentals, Sales and Buybacks: Managing Sec­
ondary Distribution Channels, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 325, 326 (1994); Karen Talley, Avis 
Advertisements Fuel Questions, 49 Bus. NEWS 1 (1990). TCI's above-mentioned stake in 
Time Warner also constitutes a similar type of passive investment, since TCI controls pro­
gramming networks that compete with Time Warner's programming networks. See infra text 
accompanying notes 98-103. Additionally, Medtronic Inc. holds a passive stake in 
SurVivaLink Corporation. Medtronic also acquired Physio-Control International Corpora­
tion, one of SurVivaLink's only two substantial competitors in the market for automated 
external defibrillators. The acquisition, coupled with the passive stake, was approved in a 
consent decree with the Federal Trade Commission. Medtronic, Inc., 63 Fed. Reg. 53,919 
(Oct. 7, 1998). For a detailed analysis of this case, see infra Section 11.C, notes 106-109 and 
accompanying text. 
Similar transactions exist in the market for on-line computer services: Paul Allen, con­
troller of a group of high-tech companies offering on-line services, purchased a minority 
stake in Stats Inc., which disseminates sports statistics electronically. Allen contemporane­
ously held a passive 18% stake in America Online Inc., another on-line service company. 
Allen also holds a minority stake in Metricom Inc, a wireless network concern. America On­
line Shareholder Said to Consider Sale, WALL ST. J ., Mar. 28, 1994, at A3; Paul Allen Buys 
Stake in Provider of Data for Sports Statistics, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at B7. In another 
striking example of passive investment among competitors, Rupert Murdoch's News Corp., 
controlling 65% of the newspaper market in Australia, passively invested around $42 million 
(more than a 2% stake) in John Fairfax Holdings Ltd., Australia's second-largest newspaper 
publisher. A passive 15% stake of Fairfax is held by Kerry Packer, Australia's biggest maga­
zine publisher. S. Karen Witcher, News Corp. Buys 12 Million Shares of John Fairfax, WALL 
ST. J., July 7, 1994, at BS. Birtcher Commercial Development Group, a fast-growing firm in 
the market for commercial, retail, and industrial buildings, holds a passive 20% stake in 
MBK Real Estate, Ltd., its competitor and one of the largest commercial builders on the 
West Coast. John O'Dell, Birtcher Returns to Commercial Construction, L.A. TIMES (Orange 
County ed.), May 21, 1996, at D11. Additionally, LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton, 
. Gucci Group N.V.'s biggest rival in the fashion industry, held a passive 20% stake in Gucci. 
John Tagliabue, Court Rules Against LVMH in Battle Over Gucci, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 
1999, at Cl. Passive and minority interests held among competitors are also abundant in the 
automobile industry. Wilson A. Alley, Partial Ownership Arrangements and Collusion in the 
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Surely if Microsoft were to merge with Apple, Northwest with 
Continental, TCI with Time Warner, Gillette with Wilkinson Sword, 
National Rent-a-Car with Avis, or Hertz with Budget, antitrust courts 
and agencies would acknowledge that such mergers may substantially 
lessen competition. But how should we treat the seemingly different 
situation where Microsoft is merely a passive investor in Apple, where 
Northwest merely holds a passive stake in 
Continental, where TCI merely holds a passive stake in Time 
Warner, where all Gillette does is passively invest in Wilkinson Sword, 
where GM (National's controller) merely purchases Avis stock as a 
passive investor, or where Hertz's controller (Ford) passively invests 
in Budget? Recent cases of passive investment in a competitor have 
gone unchallenged by antitrust agencies.9 Moreover, this Article shows 
that the leading antitrust decisions grant a de facto exemption from 
antitrust liability for passive investment, by interpreting expansively 
the "solely for investment" exception in section 7 of the Clayton Act,10 
the antitrust merger provision. 
This Article shows that these decisions on the part of antitrust 
agencies, as well as the leading cases' interpretation of the "solely for 
investment" exemption, are not in accord with sound policy considera­
tions. For even totally passive investment by a firm in its competitor 
(or by a firm's controller in the firm's competitor, as in the car rental 
examples), in an industry where only a few firms operate,11 may sub­
stantially lessen competition. The main reason, in a nutshell, is that 
such passive investment causes the investor to compete less vigorously 
with the firm in which the investment was made because such aggres­
sive12 competition would lower the value of the investor's investment. 
Automobile Industry, 45 J. INDUS. ECON. 191 (1997). Several additional examples exist on 
file with the author. 
9. The Federal Trade Commission approved TCI's stake in Time Warner, after being 
assured that this stake would be completely passive. Time Warner, Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. at 
50,301. The Federal Trade Commission also agreed to a consent decree approving 
Medtronic Inc.'s above-mentioned passive stake in SurVivaLink. Medtronic, Inc., 63 Fed. 
Reg. at 50,301. The Department of Justice, for its part, assured that Gillette's stake in 
Wilkinson Sword would be passive, approved the investment. United States v. Gillette Co., 
55 Fed. Reg. at 28,312. These matters are discussed infra Section II.C. The Department of 
Justice's suit against Northwest's acquisition of Continental stock was based on concerns 
that despite voluntary agreements temporarily restraining Northwest's control over Conti­
nental, Northwest would nevertheless be able to substantially influence Continental's com­
petitive activity. See Amended Complaint 'IPII 37-41, U.S. v. Northwest Airlines Corp., (No. 
98-74611) (D. Mich. 1998). Microsoft's passive investment in Apple has not been challenged 
by antitrust agencies to the best of the author's knowledge. 
10. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1994). 
11 .  The anticompetitive effects identified in this Article are particularly relevant in oli­
gopolies - markets with only a few substantial competitors. Even if there are numerous 
small firms, which take the price their larger competitors set as given, however, the anticom­
petitive effects identified here remain relevant. 
12. The terms "aggressive competition" or "vigorous competition" will be used inter­
changeably to refer to procompetitive actions such as undercutting a supracompetitive price. 
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Passive investment in a competitor, when there are only a few 
firms in the market, will almost always reduce quantities and raise 
prices, even when there is no ongoing cartel (tacit or explicit) in the 
industry.13 Furthermore, passive investment in a competitor facilitates 
tacit or explicit collusion. "Tacit collusion" refers to a situation in 
which firms are able to charge cartel-like prices even without commu­
nicating with each other. Each firm refrains from undercutting the 
supracompetitive price out of fear that its price cut would trigger a 
price war that would harm all firms, including the price cutting firm, in 
the long run. To be sure, passive investment also facilitates express 
collusion and cartels, not only tacit collusion. Express collusion, how­
ever, is quite easily detected and deterred by antitrust courts and 
agencies. Tacit collusion, on the other hand, which involves no com­
munication between the firms involved, is very hard to detect and to 
prove in court. Thus, it is all the more important to address the facili­
tating effect of passive investment on tacit collusion. Unlike tacit col­
lusion, passive investment among competitors, in and of itself, is an 
express transaction that is very easy to detect. 
· 
In particular, a firm that is inherently a more aggressive competitor 
than its rivals (such as a firm with a cost advantage, or a firm better­
situated to make secret price cuts), would want to invest in a compet­
ing firm in order to commit to competing less vigorously. Such a com­
mitment would reassure the investor's rivals and induce them to com­
pete less aggressively themselves.14 Thus, when the investing firm is 
one of the more aggressive competitors in its industry, the potential 
anticompetitive harm is particularly strong. As Section 11.D describes 
in greater detail, antitrust agencies are accustomed to a similar inquiry 
in their examination of horizontal mergers: they inquire as to whether 
the merger involves the acquisition of a maverick (Le., an inherently 
more aggressive) firm. 
Even the acquisition of a competitor's debt may, in certain cases, 
facilitate collusion. The case law dealing with the acquisition of a 
competitor's debt has consistently overlooked this potential anticom-
They do not refer to predatory behavior, that is, to behavior aimed at driving rivals out of 
the market. 
13. As illustrated in Section I.B infra, this price-increasing effect of passive investment 
will exist even if only one firm in the industry unilaterally invests in a competitor. Moreover, 
this effect exists even where the motivation behind the investment was not anticompetitive 
(e.g., where passive investment was motivated by an expected positive return on the invest­
ment.) 
14. As Section I.C shows in detail, the rivals of an inherently aggressive competitor 
might compete aggressively just because they know that their more aggressive competitor 
will compete aggressively anyway. This is why a commitment on the part of the inherently 
aggressive competitor to become less aggressive will induce its rivals to compete less vigor­
ously themselves. One of the implications of this result is that, even if only one firm in the 
industry passively invests in a competitor, such an investment might still facilitate collusion if 
the investing firm is an inherently more aggressive competitor. 
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petitive effect and has been concerned only with the possibility of the 
creditor using its position to influence the debtor's activities. In con­
trast, this Article shows how, even when the creditor cannot use its po­
sition to influence the debtor's activities, acquisition of a competitor's 
debt might harm competition. This anticompetitve effect is particu­
larly troublesome when the debtor is financially weak. 
Moreover, when it is a firm's controlling shareholder (whether a 
person or a parent corporation) who invests in the firm's competitor, 
as in the above-mentioned car rental examples, the investment raises 
special antitrust concerns. In particular, the controller can enhance the 
anticompetitive effect of such passive investment by diluting its stake 
in the firm it controls (e.g., by selling part of the firm's stock to public 
shareholders).15 The reason is that the lower the stake the controller 
holds in the firm it controls, the more weight the controller places on 
its stake in the competitor, and the stronger the controller's commit­
ment to manage the firm under its control as a less vigorous competi­
tor. This further implies that when it is a firm's controller that invested 
in the firm's competitor, even relatively small levels of passive invest­
ment can raise considerable antitrust concern. This is true in cases 
where the controller's stake in the firm it controls is small or might be 
diluted in the future. 
Firms can replicate this anticompetitive effect by including compo­
nents in their executive compensation packages that are positively 
linked to industry or competitors' profitability. Such compensation ar­
rangements are analogous to the case in which a controller of a firm 
holds a stake in a competing firm. Accordingly, such arrangements in­
duce the manager to manage the firm as a less vigorous competitor, 
since vigorous competition will tend to reduce components in the 
manager's compensation that are positively linked to industry or com­
petitors' profitability. Therefore, this Article shows that including such 
components in executive compensation packages might substantially 
harm competition. The anticompetitive effect of such components will 
be greater the smaller the "stake" - stock, options, or components in 
the compensation package that are positively linked to the firm's 
profits - the manager holds in the firm she manages. 
This Article claims that such executive compensation schemes 
should not be beyond the reach of antitrust law. If only passive in-
15. This result depends on the assumption that the controller will take its own interests 
into account while running the firm under its ·control. Interestingly, such behavior on the 
part of a controlling shareholder is normally seen as an "agency cost" or breach of the con­
troller's fiduciary duty, which lowers the value of the minority's shares. This Article reveals, 
however, that when a firm's controller passively invests in a competing firm, such disregard 
by the controller of the interests of minority shareholders may be valuable to the firm as a 
whole, as well as to its minority shareholders because such behavior on the part of the con­
troller enables the firm's commitment to become a less vigorous competitor. This result may 
induce the firm's rivals to compete less vigorously themselves, thereby enabling supracom­
petitive profits for all firms in the industry. 
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vestment by a firm in its competitor, or by a firm's controlling share­
holder in the firm's competitor, were scrutinized, firms could then use 
such executive compensation packages to achieve an anticompetitive 
effect analogous to that of passive investment. As this Article shows, 
such compensation schemes cannot be banned through section 7 of the 
Clayton Act16 since they normally do not involve stock or asset acqui­
sitions. Additionally, such executive compensation schemes cannot be 
banned through section 1 of the Sherman Act,17 due to the "intraen­
terprise conspiracy" doctrine (asserting that an agreement within the 
firm, such as an executive compensation agreement, fails to satisfy the 
"agreement" requirement for the purposes of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act).18 Still, as this Article proposes, such executive compen­
sation schemes should be banned, in appropriate cases, through sec­
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,19 which condemns "un­
fair methods of competition." 
The rest of the Article is organized as follows: Part I includes an 
economic analysis illustrating the anticompetitive effects of passive in­
vestment in a competitor. Section I.A, through the analysis of a simple 
numerical example, portrays the basic reasoning behind the anticom­
petitive effect of passive investment. Section LB illustrates the price­
increasing effect of passive investment in a competitor where there is 
no ongoing collusion (tacit or explicit) in the industry. Section LC 
shows how passive investment facilitates collusion and demonstrates 
how and when the acquisition of a competitor's debt may also facili­
tate collusion. Section l.D illustrates the special case where a firm's 
controlling shareholder invests in the firm's competitor. It further por­
trays the analogous anticompetitive effect of components in executive 
compensation packages that are positively linked to industry or com­
petitors' profitability. 
Part II examines the legal implications of the economic analysis 
pursued in Part I. First, Section II.A analyzes the leading cases' inter­
pretation of the exemption for acquisitions "solely for investment" in­
cluded in section 7 of the Clayton Act. This interpretation is the driv­
ing force behind these cases' treatment of passive investment in 
competitors. Section 11.B demonstrates how the leading cases' treat­
ment of passive investment grants it a de facto exemption. Then, Sec­
tion 11.C argues that antitrust agencies and courts can interpret the ex­
emption of stock acquisitions "solely for investment" to take into 
account the anticompetitive effects of passive investment. 
16. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994) (prohibiting acquisitions of "the whole or any part of the 
stock" or "the whole or any part of the assets" of another firm where "the effect of such ac­
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition . . .  "). 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (prohibiting agreements that restrain trade). 
18. See infra Section 11.E. 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994). 
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Next, Section Il.D examines the legal implications of passive in­
vestment by a maverick firm. Section 11.E portrays the legal implica­
tions of the special case where it is a firm's controller that invests in 
the firm's competitor and considers how antitrust law should deal with 
anticompetitive executive compensation schemes. Then, Section 11.F 
briefly discusses the question of welfare-enhancing benefits, or effi­
ciencies, that passive investment or anticompetitive compensation 
schemes may involve. While passive investment does not involve effi­
ciencies associated with joint control of facilities, more subtle efficien­
cies may exist. This section concludes, however, that welfare­
enhancing benefits are less likely to exist in executive compensation 
packages with components that are positively linked to industry or 
competitors' profitability. Finally, Section ILG discusses appropriate 
remedies for cases in which passive investment, or executive compen­
sation schemes, hinder competition. It concludes that divestiture of the 
stock (in the case of passive investment) and removal of the anticom­
petitive components in executive compensation schemes are the only 
effective remedies. 
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
A. A Simple Example 
In a market where only a few firms operate, when a firm invests in 
its competitor's stock, the investing firm will tend t<) compete less vig­
orously. The reason is that if the investing firm competes vigorously 
thereby causing losses to its competitor, the value of the competitor's 
stock will fall. As a result, the value of the investing firm's investment 
falls as well. 
Let us roughly illustrate this effect by using a simple hypothetical 
example. Suppose that there are only two firms in the U.S. car rental 
market: National and Avis.20 Suppose further that a vigorous competi­
tive action on the part of National (e.g., a price cut by National) will 
make National gain $1 (say, due to an increased market share) and 
make Avis lose $4 (say, due to a decreased market share and the pos­
sible price war that might follow National's price cut).21 Since National 
20. As will be demonstrated infra Sections LB and I.C.1, a similar analysis and result 
would exist for a market with more than two (although only a few) firms. 
21. It is not unnatural to assume that Avis loses $4 from National's price cut while 
National is making only $1. Price cutting on a cartel is a good example of a case in which a 
firm usually makes less from competing vigorously than its rivals lose from this vigorous 
competition: when National cuts a cartel price, it makes a short-term profit from price cut­
ting and stealing business, in the short run, from its rivals. Its rivals are expected to respond, 
however, by price cutting themselves, and a price war will follow. This reduces 
National's net gains from price cutting. Avis, on the other hand, loses from National's price 
cut in two ways: it endures a short-term loss from losing business to National, as well as a 
long-term loss due to the price war following the price cut. Therefore, it is reasonable to as-
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does not take A vis's losses into account, it will elect to pursue the 
more competitive action (e.g., it will choose to price cut), thereby 
gaining $1. But suppose now that National acquires 26% of Avis's 
stock. That is, National becomes a passive investor in Avis and shares 
26% of Avis's profit flow. National will therefore incur 26% of Avis's 
losses. If National now decides on the price cut, it will earn $1 (due to 
its own operations) but lose 26% of $4, which is greater than $1, due 
to its 26% stake in Avis. Because of its investment in Avis, National 
will now refrain from price cutting, and will choose the less competi­
tive course of action. 
Why would National want to acquire Avis's stock in the first 
place? Assuming that National does not receive extra benefits from 
such passive investment, such as a positive return on the investment, 
one might think that National would be better off if it hadn't acquired 
Avis's stock. Had National not acquired Avis's stock, it would have 
price cut and earned $1. The stock acquisition caused it not to price 
cut and to forego the $1 profit. With only this in mind, one might con­
clude that if National indeed decides to passively invest in Avis's 
stock, it is not due to anticompetitive motivations. This simple exam­
ple, however, does not capture the whole story. A look at the big pic­
ture will demonstrate that National may decide to passively invest in 
A vis's stock for strategic, anticompetitive reasons. 
In a more complex and realistic scenario, A vis, in the above­
mentioned example, will anticipate National's vigorous competition. 
This anticipation may cause Avis to compete vigorously in the first 
place. If Avis knows that National will price cut anyway (or engage in 
other vigorous competitive behavior), it may well price cut itself (or 
engage in some other vigorous competitive behavior itself), thereby 
causing losses to National. Suppose Avis would indeed price cut (in 
order to "strike first," knowing that National will price cut anyway), 
and that this would cause National losses of $4. The only way National 
can avoid these losses is to somehow commit itself not to price cut. If 
National were to make such a commitment, Avis, in this example, 
would not fear National's price cut, and would not price cut itself. In­
vestment by National in Avis's stock serves as precisely such a com­
mitment device. If National acquires 26% of Avis's stock, its incen­
tives are realigned in a way that would make price cutting by National 
unprofitable. A vis, knowing this, would be reassured and would re­
frain from price cutting itself. Thus, by investing in Avis, National in­
duces Avis to compete less vigorously, and avoids the losses from such 
vigorous competition. 
This very simple example illustrates how passive investment in a 
competitor's stock can reduce competition. Moreover, it illustrates 
sume that National's net gain from price cutting is smaller than Avis's total loss from Na­
tional's price cut. 
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how such passive investment may be motivated by strategic anticom­
petitive concerns.22 Note that this competition-reducing effect remains 
intact even if the stock acquisition is totally passive (in our example, 
National was merely a passive investor in Avis.) This is because the 
effect stems from a realignment of incentives on the part of the in­
vesting firm. It does not depend in any way on the ability of the in­
vesting firm to influence the behavior of the firm in which the invest­
ment was made. Sections l.B through l.D will provide a more detailed 
economic analysis of this anticompetitive effect. 
B. The Price-Increasing Effect of Passive Investment - the Case 
Without Collusion 
The competition-reducing effect of passive investment has been 
shown in the economics literature to hold even if firms are not en­
gaged in ongoing tacit collusion or in an explicit cartel. "Ongoing tacit 
collusion," which will be discussed in detail shortly, refers to a situa­
tion in which firms charge cartel-like prices even in the absence of 
communication among them. Each firm refrains from undercutting the 
supracompetitive price out of fear that its price cut would trigger a 
price war that would harm all firms, including the price cutting firm, in 
the long run. Even if such ongoing tacit collusion does not occur, in a 
market with only a few firms, passive investment makes the market 
less competitive: it reduces the industry's output and raises prices.23 
22. It should be stressed that, even when passive investment in a competitor's stock 
stems from motivations other than the strategic anticompetitive om:s mentioned in the text, 
the anticompetitive effect of such passive investment will remain intact. The example above 
shows how, after National invests in Avis's stock, whatever National's motivations for such 
stock acquisition, National will tend to compete with Avis less vigorously. In most industry 
settings with only a few firms, when one competitor becomes a less vigorous competitor, 
overall competition in the industry is reduced. See infra Section LB. 
23. This result was demonstrated, through the use of economic models, by Robert J. 
Reynolds & Bruce R. Snapp, The Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests and Joint 
Ventures, 4 INT'L J. INDUST. ORG. 141 (1986); see also Timothy F. Bresnahan & Steven C. 
Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint Ventures, 4 INT'L J. INDUST. 
ORG. 155 (1986); Daniel P. O'Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Own­
ership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 (2000) (discussing 
briefly the above-mentioned effect on the investing firm's unilateral pricing behavior while 
analyzing at length the effect of non-passive partial acquisition on the acquired firm's be­
havior). It should be noted that, in markets with homogenous products (i.e., those that do 
not vary from firm to firm, such as cement), passive investment might not affect industry 
price or quantity if firms are not engaged in ongoing collusion. David Gilo, Partial Owner­
ship as a Strategic Variable to Facilitate Tacit Collusion, at §§ 2.21, 3.1.1 (John M. Olin Dis­
cussion Paper No. 170, Program in Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School) 
(1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In such cases, the anticompetitive im­
pact of passive investment may be explained only through its effects on the facility of collu­
sion. See infra Section LC. 
The only empirical work studying the effect of passive investment on industry prices is 
the recent study of Alley, supra note 8. The result of this study is that the U.S. automobile 
market is less competitive than the Japanese one, while there is more passive investment 
among competitors in the Japanese market than in the U.S. market. As Alley states, this re-
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We saw similar reasoning in the numerical example of Section I.A 
above. In a market with only a few firms, even when there is no on­
going collusion, firms realize the impact of pricing and quantity deci­
sions on their competitors' profits.24 In such a market, if one firm in­
vests in part of its competitor's stock, the investor competes less 
vigorously, since it incurs some of the competitor's losses from the in­
vestor's vigorous competition. The investor decides, ceteris paribus, to 
produce less and charge more than it would have but for the invest­
ment.25 
It should be noted that passive investment by a firm in a competi­
tor, where there are only a few firms in the market, will cause industry 
prices to rise (and quantities to fall) even if there are firms in the in­
dustry that did not invest in a competitor. Suppose that in the example 
of Section I.A there are not two firms in the car rental industry but 
three: National, Avis, and Hertz. If National invests in Avis's stock, 
National, as illustrated in the preceding paragraph, becomes a less 
suit is consistent with the theoretical economics literature's prediction that when a market is 
relatively more competitive (e.g., because it includes more competitors, as does the Japanese 
automobile market) there will be more passive investment among competitors, because they 
will want to soften the intense competition among them. Id. at 193; see also David Reitman, 
Partial Ownership Arrangements and the Potential for Collusion, 42 J. INDUS. ECON. 313 
(1994). 
Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner briefly state that, when a firm passively acquires the 
stock of its competitor, "the acquiring firm's market decisions might now be affected not 
only by their impact on its own operations but also by their impact on its investment . . .  in its 
competitor. Competition on the borderline of profitability may be abandoned if it seems 
likely to result in an investment loss." PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TuRNER, 
ANTITRUST LA w 'lI 1203, 320 (1978). This statement captures the basic intuition according to 
which passive investment in a competitor causes the investor to become a less vigorous com­
petitor. It is, however, too narrow a statement. It implies that only when firms do not earn 
much when they compete, will passive investment cause them to behave less competitively. 
In contrast, as the current section explains, passive investment will always tend to raise 
prices. This result does not depend on the firms' profits being particularly small when they 
compete. With respect to the case with collusion, as will be shown infra Section LC, Areeda 
and Turner's basic intuition is not enough to conclude that passive investment facilitates 
collusion. A more subtle, case-specific analysis is needed. 
24. The larger the passive investment levels and the fewer substantial competitors in the 
market, the larger the anticompetitive effect. "Substantial competitors," in this context, re­
fers to firms that are large enough that their behavior (e.g., price cutting), affects competing 
firms' profits. In the same vein, if new entry of substantial competitors, or expansion of in­
substantial competitors is likely to occur in the future, the anticompetitive threat of passive 
investment diminishes. 
25. Stating the same reasoning differently, an oligopolistic firm's profit-maximizing price 
is constrained by the fear that raising the price drives some consumers into the hands of 
competitors. Passive investment in a competitor reduces this loss and therefore induces a 
higher profit-maximizing price. The same reasoning applies to nonprice competition, such as 
quality or service competition, or competition with regard to the development of new tech­
nology. A firm that has invested in its competitor's stock may also be less inclined to com­
pete with the competitor over geographic markets or population segments served by this 
competitor. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, at 320. Moreover, a potential entrant 
that has invested in an incumbent firm's stock will be less inclined to enter the incumbent 
firm's market. See Reynolds & Snapp, supra note 23, at 150. 
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vigorous competitor and decreases output. Under reasonable assump­
tions regarding firms' costs and market demand, this will cause total 
industry output to fall, and prices to rise, even though A vis and Hertz 
did not invest in their competitors' stock. The result is the same even 
in cases where Avis and Hertz respond to National's reduction of out­
put by themselves raising output. National's contraction of output can 
be shown to dominate,26 so that total industry quantity indeed dimin­
ishes. Therefore, industry price will still rise.27 
This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that, in a market 
with only a few firms, these firms realize the impact of their behavior 
on industry price and quantities. When National, in our example, re­
duces output, A vis and Hertz might respond by raising their output 
levels, but only up to the level where an additional unit of output 
brings them revenue equal to the cost of producing this marginal unit. 
Hertz and A vis realize that each additional unit that they produce 
raises aggregate supply and thus lowers industry prices. Hence, the 
marginal revenue they derive from producing an additional unit gets 
lower and lower, until finally it is no longer worthwhile to produce an 
additional unit. This makes A vis and Hertz expand output by less than 
National's initial output reduction.28 
In many other cases, A vis and Hertz may themselves tend to re­
duce output and raise prices in response to National's contraction of 
output.29 Here, obviously, investment by National in Avis's stock will 
raise industry prices and reduce industry output. Indeed, in these cases 
26. Reynolds & Snapp, supra note 23. 
27. To be sure, in the case where Avis and Hertz respond to National's contraction of 
output by themselves raising output, a form of interaction called "strategic substitutes" in 
the economics literature, see generally Jeremy Bulow et al., Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic 
Substitutes and Complements, 93 J. POL. ECON. 488 (1985), National's passive investment in 
Avis could not be predicated on anticompetitive motivations. This is because National will 
expect to lose market share and profits to its rivals. See Reitman, supra note 23. Still, as ex­
plained in the text, if National indeed decides to passively invest in Avis (i.e., for other moti­
vations, such as an expected positive return on the investment) prices will indeed rise and 
the anticompetitive effect remains. 
28. Reynolds & Snapp, supra note 23. To illustrate this phenomenon, suppose there are 
initially two firms in the market (i.e., the market is a duopoly) and one of the firms exits the 
market (i.e., reduces its output to zero.) Thus, the market is served by a monopoly instead of 
a duopoly. Although the remaining firm will normally expand output after its competitor 
exits, it is well known that a monopoly's output is smaller than a duopoly's aggregate output. 
The monopolist will maximize its profits by expanding output only until the revenue pro­
duced by an additional unit equals the cost of producing this additional unit. Accordingly, 
the monopoly expands output by less than the output reduction which occurred upon the 
exit of the other firm. See generally JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 220 (1988); see also Reynolds & Snapp, supra note 23. 
29. The question of whether, in a particular industry, firms respond to their rival's re­
duction of output by themselves reducing, or rather by expanding, their output might be dif­
ficult to answer in practice. For a formal presentation of the distinction between the two 
cases, known in the economics literature as the distinction between "strategic complements" 
and "strategic substitutes," see Bulow et al., supra note 27; TiROLE, supra note 28, at 323-28. 
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National may want to passively invest in Avis and commit to less vig­
orous competition in order to induce A vis and Hertz to compete less 
vigorously themselves. 
C. Passive Investment as a Facilitator of Collusion 
1. Passive Stock Acquisition 
Section LB discussed the case in which firms were not colluding 
over the industry price. But what happens when firms are colluding, 
whether tacitly or explicitly? What is the effect of passive investment 
on such collusion? "Tacit collusion" might occur where there are only 
a few firms in the market and they interact on an ongoing basis. In 
such a situation, as economic theory shows, it is possible that cartel­
like pricing will be sustained. Each firm refrains froin price cutting, 
because it understands that its price cut will trigger a price war that 
will make all firms, including the price-cutter, worse off in the long 
run.30 Tacit collusion is not always possible, however. In particular, 
tacit collusion will not be sustainable when one or more firms find 
price cutting profitable in spite of the price war that would likely fol­
low. 
Passive investment facilitates the sustainability of collusion by 
making price cutting less profitable. When firms are tacitly colluding, 
each firm faces a tradeoff. Their dilemma involves the relative costs 
and merits of short-term profit versus long-term loss. Short-term profit 
can be made by price cutting on the collusive price (consequently ex­
panding the price cutting firm's market share). However, the price­
cutter will incur long-term loss if a price war is induced. When a firm's 
profit from price cutting is larger than the expected loss from a price 
war, the firm will price cut, and collusion will not be sustainable.31 If a 
firm invests in its competitor's stock, however, its profits from price 
cutting diminish. If it price cuts, the competitor's profits will fall, and 
so will the value of the price cutting firm's investment in the competi­
tor. 
Let us illustrate the effect of passive stock acquisition on the 
sustainability of collusion by modifying slightly the more general nu­
merical example of Section I.A. Suppose National and Avis are tacitly 
30. See TIROLE, supra note 28, ch. 6. Passive investment also facilitates express collusion 
and cartels, not only tacit collusion, in the same way as portrayed in the following discussion 
of tacit collusion. Still, as explained in the Introduction supra, the facilitating effect on tacit 
collusion raises particular policy concerns. 
31. It is enough if one of the firms in the market finds price cutting profitable for collu­
sion in this market to break down completely. If the other firms anticipate that their com­
petitor will price cut, they will not want to tacitly collude in the first place. In addition, even 
assuming firms were indeed tacitly colluding over a supracompetitive price, if one of them is 
tempted to price cut this will induce a price war that will cause the supracompetitive price to 
break down. 
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colluding over a high price. Assume National would gain $4 by price 
cutting and its expected future loss due to the price war such a price 
cut would trigger is $3. Thus, without investing in Avis's stock, 
National will price cut (since $4 is greater than $3). Suppose now that 
National passively acquires 25% of Avis's stock. National will now 
share Avis's losses from National's price cut. If, for instance, Avis 
loses a total of $8 from the price cut and the price war that follows it,32 
National will lose $5 from price cutting (it will lose $3 from the price 
war following the price cut, due to its own operations, and 25% of $8, 
which is $2, due to its stake in A vis.) Thus, after investing in A vis's 
stock, National will not find price cutting profitable (since $4 is less 
than $5). 
A few scholars have previously tackled the question of how passive 
investment might facilitate tacit or express collusion. Herbert 
Hovenkamp briefly states that, "[u]nder the rules of competition, A 
would like nothing better than to force B out of the market through 
A's greater efficiency. As a result of partial acquisition [by A of B], 
however, A suddenly has a strong financial interest in B's welfare. The 
risks of tacit or express collusion may increase dramatically."33 
Reynolds & Snapp34 focused, in their economic model, on the effects 
of passive investment where there is no collusion. When discussing 
possible extensions of their economic model, however, they briefly 
discuss passive investment's possible collusion-facilitating effect. They 
point out that passive investment makes price cutting less profitable. 
This basic intuition that passive investment might facilitate collu­
sion is not enough, however, to draw a clear policy implication against 
passive investment among competitors. Even in industries with only a 
few firms, where tacit collusion is plausible, a few counterarguments 
could be made to rebut this basic reasoning. The first counterargu­
ment is that, even though passive investment caused price cutting to 
be unprofitable to National (the investing firm in the above­
mentioned example), National's competitors, including Avis (the firm 
in which the investment was made), might still want to price cut. Their 
incentive to price cut is unaffected by National's passive investment in 
A vis, and their eagerness to price cut will cause collusion to break 
down, regardless of National's passive investment in Avis. 
At first blush, it seems like this counterargument means that all 
firms in the industry need to passively invest in a competitor in order 
for collusion to be facilitated by passive investment. If this were true, 
it would significantly weaken the policy objection to passive invest-
32. Avis's losses from National's price cut include Avis's short-term loss (due to a tem­
porary loss of market share) and Avis's long-term losses from the price war following the 
price cut. 
33. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 497 (1994). 
34. Supra note 23. 
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ment, since it is seldom the case that all firms in an industry have pas­
sively invested in their competitors. As Section LC.La illustrates be­
low, however, this counterargument applies only to industries in which 
all firms are equally inclined to price cut. As will be shown, if some 
firms in the industry are more inclined to price cut (more "trigger­
happy") than others, it is enough if the more trigger-happy firms pas­
sively invest in competitors in order for collusion to be facilitated. 
The second counterargument to the idea that passive investment 
facilitates collusion concerns a point made by David Malueg.35 Malueg 
uses an economic model to show that an increase in passive invest­
ment levels could actually make collusion more difficult, and is there­
fore potentially procompetitive. As Section LC.Lb discusses below, 
however, Malueg's result turns out to be of little policy significance 
when one acknowledges that firms elect their passive investment levels 
and that these levels are not exogenously given, as Malueg assumed. 
a. The Correct Focus: The Relative Trigger Happiness of the Inves­
tor. Is it true that in order for passive investment to facilitate collusion, 
all firms in the industry must passively invest in a competitor? As 
demonstrated below, this argument will be true only in cases where all 
firms in the industry are equally inclined to price cut. To illustrate, 
suppose National and Avis are the only firms in the industry and are 
equally inclined to price cut. In particular, suppose both make $4 from 
price cutting and lose only $3 in the price war following a price cut. 
Thus both firms would price cut on a collusive price and collusion is 
not sustainable in the industry. Here investment by only one firm in 
the other's stock will not suffice to facilitate collusion. Suppose only 
National invests in 25% of Avis's stock. Suppose further that Avis's 
total losses from National's price cut are $8.36 National would then 
gain $4 and lose $5 from price cutting ($3 due to National's own losses 
from a price war and 25% of $8, which is $2, due to National's stake in 
Avis.) Thus, National loses more from a price cut than it gains, and 
would prefer not to price cut. Still, National may well know that Avis 
will price cut anyway, since Avis's incentives are left unchanged by 
National's investment in Avis. 
The fact that Avis's incentives are not changed by National's pas­
sive investment in A vis can be illustrated as follows: It is clear that if 
Avis's managers maximize Avis's total profits, including National's 
share in these profits, A vis would still want to price cut. This is be­
cause 100% of $4 is greater than 100% of $3 (Avis gains $4 from price 
cutting and loses $3 from a price war), and thus Avis's managers 
35. David A. Malueg, Collusive Behavior and Partial Ownership of Rivals, 10 INT'L J. 
INDUST. ORO. 27 (1992). 
36. For example, assume that if National price cuts, Avis loses $5 as a short-term loss 
(due to a temporary loss of market share) and $3 from the price war that follows the price 
cut. 
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would find price cutting by A vis profitable. The same result holds, 
however, even if Avis's managers, while running Avis, disregard the 
profits that belong to National as a passive investor (i.e., Avis's man­
agers take into account only 75% of Avis's total profits.) In such a 
case, A vis's managers would compare a gain of 75% of $4 from price 
cutting to a loss equal to 75% of $3 from the price war that would fol­
low a price cut. Again, Avis's managers would make Avis price cut, 
since 75% of $4 is greater than 75% of $3. 
We can see that even in the case where Avis's managers disregard 
the profits flowing to National as a passive investor, their disregard af­
fects Avis's gains and losses from price cutting in equal proportions. It 
lowers the gains from price cutting, but also lowers (by the same pro­
portion) the expected losses from the price war that would follow a 
price cut. 
Accordingly, Avis will stilJ find it profitable to price cut. If Na­
tional knows that Avis will price cut anyway, National will refrain 
from tacitly colluding, and collusion will not be sustainable in the in­
dustry.37 The same reasoning implies that if only Avis invests in Na­
tional, collusion will remain unsustainable. Since National's incentives 
would remain unchanged, it would still be inclined to price cut. 
The same result holds if there are additional firms in the industry 
that are equally inclined to price cut (e.g., they make $4 from a price 
cut and lose $3 from a price war) and have not invested in a competi­
tor. Their eagerness to price cut is left unchanged by National's in­
vestment in Avis, meaning that collusion is not sustainable in the in­
dustry regardless of National's investment in Avis. 
Accordingly, if all firms in the industry are equally trigger-happy, 
the only way passive investment can facilitate collusion is if each firm 
in the industry passively invests in a competitor. In the example with 
only National and Avis in the industry, if National invests in 25% of 
Avis's stock and Avis invests in 25% of National's stock, they will both 
find price cutting unprofitable. Consequently, neither of them will fear 
that the other will price cut, and collusion will become sustainable.38 
The situation is different, however, in markets in which firms are 
not all equally trigger-happy. Indeed, most markets are characterized 
by some firms being more trigger-happy than others. For example, a 
firm with lower marginal costs will tend, other things being equal, to 
be more trigger-happy than a firm with higher marginal costs.39 Sec-
37. Even if National attempts to charge a collusive price, Avis would then price cut, and 
collusion would break down. 
38. For an economic model illustrating this result, see Gilo, supra note 23, at § 2. 
39. The reason a low-cost firm tends to be more trigger-happy is somewhat subtle and 
stems from two factors. First, a low-cost firm's profits during a price war are higher than 
those of a high-cost firm. Secondly, a low-cost firm's "monopoly price" (i.e., the price that 
would maximize the low-cost firm's profits if it were to serve the whole market) is lower than 
a high-cost firm's "monopoly price." A low-cost firm may still be less trigger-happy than its 
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ond, when one of the firms, for some reason, has a smaller market 
share, it can be shown that this firm is more trigger-happy, other 
things being equal, than firms with larger market shares.40 This is be­
cause the firm with the smaller market share has less to gain from 
collusion and much more to gain from price cutting. Through price 
cutting, the small firm can potentially earn a high short-term profit by 
expanding its market share considerably. A large firm tends to be less 
eager to price cut, since its gains from collusion are high and the po­
tential increase in its market share from price cutting is less substan­
tial. 
Many other scenarios exist in which one firm is more trigger-happy 
than its competitors. For instance, a firm may do business in more 
large, infrequent deals than its competitors or in a manner that delays 
detection of its price cuts. This can occur, for instance, when a certain 
manufacturer regularly sells to a small group of large wholesalers for 
prices that can be kept secret from competitors, at least for a time. 
Such a firm is relatively more prone than other firms to price cut.41 If 
other firms in the same market sell to end consumers or engage in 
more frequent transactions, or if price cutting by them is detected 
more quickly, they will be inherently less prone to price cut and thus 
less trigger-happy. 
In markets in which some firms are more trigger-happy than oth­
ers, it is enough if the more trigger-happy firms invest in a competitor 
for collusion to be facilitated. To illustrate, assume that, as in the ex­
ample above, without investing in Avis, National would find it profit­
able to price cut, since it gains $4 from price cutting and loses only $3 
due to a price war. But now let us assume that Avis would gain $4 by 
price cutting and would lose $5 from a price war. Avis would therefore 
prefer not to price cut on a collusive price. In this sense, National is 
more trigger-happy than is Avis. 
If it were up to A vis, it would not price cut on a collusive price. 
Avis would find it more profitable to sustain collusion. But if National 
does not invest in Avis, Avis might know that National - the trigger­
happy firm - will price cut. Accordingly, Avis will not charge a collu­
sive price in the first place, since it knows National will undercut it 
high-cost competitor if this high-cost firm has a small enough market share. As will be 
shown, a firm with a smaller market share is itself, other things being equal, more trigger­
happy than a firm with a larger market share. Therefore, the high-cost firm will be more 
trigger-happy if the market share effect dominates the cost difference effect. Indeed, since 
more efficient firms tend to have larger market shares, these effects tend to counteract each 
other. However, if the high-cost firm's market share is part of the collusive scheme (say, be­
cause colluding firms allocate market shares among themselves), the low-cost firm will be 
more trigger-happy regardless of the high-cost firm's market share (as shown by Gilo, supra 
note 23, at § 3.) 
40. Reynolds & Snapp, supra note 23, at 149. 
41. TIROLE, supra note 28, at 248. 
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anyway. This harms National. Were collusion going on, National 
would gain from price cutting. However, because of National's known 
tendency to price cut, there is no collusion in the first place, and no 
collusive price to undercut. National would rather have ongoing collu­
sion with supracompetitive prices than a competitive outcome in 
which collusion is not sustainable. Thus, National would want to 
commit not to price cut, in order to reassure A vis and induce A vis to 
collude over a supracompetitive price. National can make such a 
commitment by investing in 25% of Avis's stock. As illustrated above, 
such an investment will make price cutting unprofitable to National. 
Avis, thereby assured that National would not price cut, would itself 
be induced to tacitly collude. Thus, collusion, in this example, is facili­
tated by a single instance of passive investment: passive investment by 
National, the more trigger-happy firm.42 
The strategic motivation of a more trigger-happy firm to passively 
invest in its competitor has not yet been acknowledged by either the 
legal or the economics literature. The economics literature has focused 
either on models in which firms are identical, that is, where one firm is 
not more trigger-happy than the other,43 or on cases in which firms do 
not interact on an ongoing basis as they do in the case of collusion.44 
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, for example, found that in their 
model a low-cost firm would never want to passively invest in a high­
cost firm. With regard to the prevailing phenomenon of low-cost firms 
partially acquiring high-cost firms, they conclude that "such purchases 
will be profitable only if (the low-cost firm] gains control over (the 
high-cost firm's] actions . . . .  "45 In contrast, as illustrated above, when 
repeated interaction among firms and ongoing collusion are intro­
duced, the low-cost firm may want to passively invest in the high-cost 
firm. In cases where the low-cost firm is more trigger-happy, it can fa­
cilitate collusion by passively investing in its competitor and commit­
ting to be less inclined to price cut. 
The same result holds for a market with more than two (although 
only a few) firms. To illustrate, suppose National, in our example, is 
the only trigger-happy firm in the industry, and that there are other 
firms in the industry, identical to A vis, that are less vigorous competi­
tors (e.g., that gain $4 from price cutting and lose $5 from a price war, 
and thus would prefer · collusion to price cutting.) Nevertheless, if 
National does not invest in any of its competitors' stock, none of 
42. For an economic model showing this result, see Gilo, supra note 23, at section 3. 
43. See, e.g. , Malueg, supra note 35. 
44. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Asset Ownership and Market Structure in 
Oligopoly, 21 RAND J. ECON. 275 (1990). 
45. Id. at 287. 
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National's rivals will tacitly collude, if they know National would price 
cut anyway. 
Here, too, National can induce all of its rivals to tacitly collude 
only if it commits itself not to price cut. For such a commitment, 
National need not invest in all its competitors. It suffices for National 
to invest in one (or more) of its competitors in a way that makes price 
cutting by National unprofitable. In this example, suppose National 
invests in 25% of one of its competitor's (say, Avis's) stock, and that 
Avis loses $8 from National's price cut and the price war that follows 
it. National will lose $5 from price cutting ($3 due to its own opera­
tions and 25% of $8, which is $2, due to its stake in Avis). This makes 
price cutting by National unprofitable. Such a commitment by 
National not to price cut would be enough to induce all firms in the 
industry to tacitly collude. It would make collusion sustainable, to the 
benefit of all firms, including National.46 
This result also holds generally: a firm that is inherently a more ag­
gressive competitor (e.g., due to a cost advantage, a relatively small 
market share, large and infrequent and/or secret deals with wholesal­
ers, and so on)47 may have a strategic motivation to unilaterally invest 
in a competitor. Without such investment in a competitor's stock, 
since this firm's trigger-happiness is observed by its less vigorous ri­
vals, they will compete aggressively themselves, knowing that the 
trigger-happy firm will compete aggressively anyway. In this sense, a 
firm's trigger happiness is a curse for the firm rather than a blessing. 
The only way for the trigger-happy firm to induce its less vigorous 
competitors to tacitly collude, and thus make all firms better off, is to 
commit to becoming a less vigorous competitor. Investment by the 
trigger-happy firm in a competitor's stock (National's investment in 
A vis in the above-mentioned example) serves as such a commitment.48 
46. To be sure, the fewer competitors in the market, the more likely that passive invest­
ment in only one of them will enable collusion. This conclusion follows for two reasons. 
First, the fewer substantial competitors, the larger a single competitor's losses from the in­
vestor's price cut. Second, the fewer substantial competitors, the more likely the less trigger­
happy firms are to prefer collusion in the first place. 
47. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
48. Such a commitment is credible. The firm investing in a competitor's stock cannot 
circumvent its commitment by selling its holdings in the competitor to a third party, thereby 
making price cutting profitable. Such an attempt is detectable and will signal an intention to 
price cut to the competitors, who will retaliate immediately and price cut themselves. This 
will prevent the short-term gain the investing firm could have made by price cutting. It is 
reasonable to assume that becoming a significant passive investor in a competitor, as well as 
ceasing to be one, are common knowledge to competitors, After all, if the firm in which the 
investment was made is publicly traded and the passive investment exceeds 5% of its out­
standing stock, securities regulation compels the firm to disclose the investment. Likewise, if 
the investor ceased to hold above 5 % of the stock, this too must be disclosed. See SEC 
Regulation S-K, item 403(a)-(c), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1992). Conversely, if the firms in­
volved are closely held, passive investment requires an explicit contract and negotiation. It is 
difficult to maintain the secrecy of either such an investment, or of the fact that the investor 
has sold the stock. At least the firm in which the investment was made will surely know that 
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The preceding analysis implies that where some firms in the indus­
try are more trigger-happy than others, it is not necessary that each 
firm in the industry invest in a competitor's stock in order for collusion 
to be facilitated. All that is needed to facilitate collusion is investment 
by the trigger-happy firm (or firms) in the stock of one of its competi­
tors. 
b. Acknowledging That Passive Investment Is a Decision Variable. 
We shall now consider a second objection to the idea that passive in­
vestment facilitates collusion: namely, Malueg's economic model, 
which shows how an increase in passive investment levels might even 
make collusion more difficult.49 The reason for Malueg's result is that 
passive investment not only makes price cutting less profitable, but 
also tends to make price wars less costly. It tends to soften price wars 
because it is conventionally assumed that during price wars firms re­
vert to charging the prices they would have charged in equilibrium 
without collusion. As Section LB illustrated above, however, even in a 
market equilibrium without collusion, passive investment will usually 
raise prices and, at the same time, will tend to raise profits.50 Accord­
ingly, passive investment causes price wars to be less costly (assuming 
price wars consist of reverting to the price firms would charge in equi­
librium without collusion). Recall that under tacit collusion, a firm will 
price cut if its short-term profits from price cutting outweigh the long­
term loss from a price war. While passive investment among competi­
tors makes the short-term gain from price cutting smaller, it also 
makes the long-term loss from price wars smaller as well. In Malueg's 
model, for certain levels of passive investment, the latter effect (of sof­
tening the threat from price wars) dominates, and an increase in pas­
sive investment levels will actually hinder collusion. 
Malueg's result is, however, of little policy significance once we ac­
knowledge that it is the firms themselves which elect the level of their 
passive investment in a competitor and that passive investment is not 
exogenously given, as Malueg assumed. Assuming that firms are 
savvy, they will not elect to passively invest in a competitor in a way 
that will hinder collusion, because collusion leads to monopoly profits. 
The only exception would be cases in which passive investment is 
driven by other motivations which are so profit-enhancing that they 
are worth hindering collusion and sacrificing monopoly profits. 
the investor has sold its stock. Knowing that the former investor has, by ceasing to have a 
stake in a competitor, regained its "trigger happiness," the firm in which the investment was 
made will respond accordingly. 
49. See supra note 35. 
50. For an exception, see supra note 23, which analyzes the case of a market with ho­
mogenous products. 
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2. Acquisition of a Competitor's Debt 
21 
In addition to passive acquisition of a competitor's equity, acquisi­
tion of a competitor's debt may also, in certain circumstances, facili­
tate collusion.51 This is the case when vigorous competition increases 
the probability of the competitor's insolvency. If a firm is a creditor of 
its competitor, and vigorous competition by the creditor increases the 
probability of the debtor's bankruptcy, the creditor may hesitate to 
compete aggressively, since this raises the probability that the debt will 
never be fully repaid. Thus, in cases in which the debtor is financially 
weak, or where vigorous competition by the creditor may significantly 
raise the probability of the debtor's insolvency, acquisition of debt 
may serve as a strategic commitment by the creditor to compete less 
aggressively.52 A firm extending a loan to its competitor under such 
circumstances thereby commits to competing less vigorously. This may 
induce competing firms to behave less competitively themselves, to 
the benefit of the creditor.53 
· 
It should be noted, however, that the anticompetitive impact of 
debt acquisition is much more limited than that of stock acquisition. 
Acquisition of a competitor's debt makes the creditor compete less 
aggressively only to the extent that aggressive competition will suffi­
ciently raise the probability of the debtor's insolvency. Acquisition of 
a competitor's stock, on the other hand, makes the stock acquirer 
share the competitor's ongoing profit flow. This profit flow is pre­
sumably always reduced by vigorous competition. Furthermore, acqui­
sition of debt in a competitor will not cause the creditor to compete 
less vigorously if there is sufficient collateral (unaffected by vigorous 
competition) to guarantee the loan. In such a case, even if the debtor 
becomes insolvent as a result of the creditor's aggressive competition, 
the creditor can recover the debt from this collateral. Accordingly, the 
creditor will not be deterred from vigorously competing with the 
debtor. 
51. For examples of such debt acquisition, see United States v. Gillette Co., 55 F.R. 
28312 (1990); Mr. Frank, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 859, 862, 867 (N.D. Ill. 
1984); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1969). 
52. A different question that might arise is why a firm would want to extend a loan to a 
competitor who is financially weak. It might be argued that a preferable strategy is to com­
pete vigorously with such a firm in order to cause it to go bankrupt and drive it out of the 
market. Although this would sometimes be the preferred strategy, it need not be the case. 
For example, it is possible that, after the competitor becomes insolvent and stops operating, 
it is expected that its productive facilities and assets would be purchased by a stronger, more 
aggressive, competitor. In such a case, it might be a preferable strategy for other firms in the 
industry to keep the financially weak competitor operating. 
53. The reasoning here is identical to that of the stock acquisition case analyzed supra 
Sections l.C.1 and I.A. 
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D. Passive Investment by Controllers and Executive Compensation 
We will now examine the case in which a firm's controller (be it a 
parent corporation, or an individual possessing active control of the 
firm) passively invests in the firm's competitor. Many examples of this 
form of investment (hereinafter termed "passive investment by con­
trollers") can be found in practice. A striking example of passive in­
vestment by controllers, already mentioned in the introduction, ex­
isted, for several years, in the car rental industry. National Car 
Rental's controller, GM, passively acquired a 25% stake in Avis, 
National's competitor. In this very same industry, Hertz's controller, 
Ford, had acquired $324 million worth of Budget's nonvoting stock.54 
Several additional examples exist.55 
When a controller of a firm invests in one of the firm's competi­
tors, the anticompetitive effect may be even stronger than in a case in 
which the firm itself invests in its competitor. In particular, the con­
troller can strengthen the anticompetitive effect by diluting its stake in 
the firm it controls. Again we turn to a simple numerical example. 
Suppose GM (National's controller) passively acquires 25% of Avis, 
which is National's competitor. Suppose further that GM initially 
holds 100% of National. Assume that if National competes vigorously 
(e.g., price cuts), National makes a net gain of $3 but Avis loses $8. 
Thus, assuming GM indeed controls National's pricing policy,56 GM 
will cause National to price cut, because GM makes $3 (100% of $3) 
from price cutting, and, because of its 25% share in Avis, GM loses 
only $2 (25% of $8), which is less than $3. 
Suppose now, however, that GM dilutes its stake in National to 
55% instead of 100%. The other 45% may be held, for example, by 
public shareholders, or by nonpublic minority shareholders that do not 
possess control. Assume further that GM runs National so as to 
maximize GM's own profits. That is, assume that GM disregards prof­
its that flow into the hands of passive investors in National.57 It is easy 
to see that now GM will refrain from making National price cut. GM 
now gains only $1.65 (55% of $3) from a price cut, and loses $2 (25% 
of $8) (because of GM's 25% stake in Avis). Since $1 .65 is less than 
$2, GM will not make National price cut. 
54. Purohit & Staelin, supra note 8; Talley, supra note 8. 
55. See supra note 8. 
56. In general, the controller of a firm will control the firm's pricing policy when the 
controlling shareholder is also the manager, or CEO, of the firm, or at least has close scru­
tiny over the manager's activities. This will also be the case, however, where the controlling 
shareholder does not actually manage the firm. Assuming the controlling shareholder has 
control over appointments of the board of directors and managers of the firm and also moni­
tors executives' decisions, the firm's manager and board will no doubt take the controller's 
interest into account if they wish to maintain their positions. 
57. This assumption will be discussed shortly. 
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Therefore, the dilution of GM's stake in National (from 100% to 
55%) made GM run National as a less vigorous competitor. This is be­
cause the smaller the stake GM has in National, the more weight GM 
places on its stake in Avis and the less competitively National is run by 
GM. Indeed, if we were to dilute GM's stake in National further, GM 
would gain even less from making National price cut, while GM's loss 
from this price cut due to its stake in A vis would be left unchanged. 
For example, if GM owns only 50% (instead of 55%) of National, GM 
gains only $1.50 (50% of $3) as opposed to $1.65 from making Na­
tional price cut, while it still loses $2 (25% of $8), as before, from this 
price cut, due to its stake in A vis. Indeed, GM can strategically 
strengthen its commitment to run National less competitively by sell­
ing out part of National to passive shareholders (be they public, or 
other minority shareholders).58 This sell out would reduce GM's stake 
in National, and strengthen the commitment value of GM's stake in 
Avis. Such a commitment could be valuable to GM as well as to Na­
tional, because it could induce Avis to compete less vigorously itself.59 
The preceding analysis illustrates how passive investment by a 
firm's controller can serve as a stronger commitment to reduce compe­
tition than passive investment by the firm itself. In our example, if it 
had been National itself (and not GM) that had acquired 25% of 
Avis's stock, National would have price cut regardless of GM's stake 
in National. Suppose, as above, that GM holds 55% of National and 
controls the decision of whether National price cuts. GM gains $1 .65 
(55% of $3) from making National price cut, and loses 55% x 25% x 
$8 = $1.1,  due to National's stake in Avis (since GM holds 55% in 
National and National, in turn, holds 25% in Avis - that is, GM has 
an indirect stake of 55% x 25% in Avis). Thus GM will decide on a 
price cut by National, because $1 .65 is greater than $1.1.  The control­
ler's stake in the firm it controls will always be irrelevant when it is the 
firm itself that invested in its competitor. Our example illustrates this 
nicely: GM's stake in National (55%) affects GM's gains and losses 
from National's price cut in equal proportions. If GM's stake in 
National is diluted (say, from 100% to 55% ), this will not increase the 
weight GM places on National's 25% stake in Avis, because GM's in­
direct stake (through National) in Avis will be diluted proportionately. 
There is another important feature of the analysis that should be 
illuminated. Note that we have assumed, throughout the above exam-
58. This is not to say that all decisions by controllers to sell out part of their firms are 
motivated by strategic commitments to compete less aggressively. Still, we should not over­
look the fact that such motivations for strategic commitment exist when the controller of a 
firm has invested in the firm's competitor. These strategic motivations may be factored into 
the controller's decision to sell part of the firm it controls and may affect the size of the 
block which is sold. 
59. This conclusion is explained in the discussion of passive investment by the firms 
themselves, see supra Sections I.A, LB, and I.C.l. 
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pies, that GM takes its own interests into account while running 
National. First, we assumed that GM takes its 25% stake in Avis into 
account in running National. Then we assumed that when GM's stake 
in National is diluted (say, to 55% ), GM, while running National, does 
not take into account the profits flowing to minority shareholders in 
National. Interestingly, when a controlling shareholder takes account 
of its own interests in running the firm under its control, or disregards 
the profits flowing to minority shareholders in the firm it controls, this 
is normally seen as an "agency cost," or breach of the controller's fi­
duciary duty, which lowers the value of the minority's shares. The 
analysis here shows, however, that this "agency cost" may be valuable 
to National as a whole, as well as to its minority shareholders. 
The fact that GM takes its stake in A vis into account in running 
National enables National to commit to becoming a less vigorous 
competitor. In addition, the fact that GM disregards the profits flow­
ing to National's minority shareholders strengthens this commitment.60 
In various industry settings, it is a profitable strategy for a firm to 
commit to being a less vigorous competitor, since this induces other 
competitors to behave less vigorously themselves, thereby raising the 
profits of all firms in the industry. This would be the case when the 
firm's commitment not to price cut facilitates ongoing collusion.61 
Even if there is no ongoing collusion in the industry, in many industry 
settings, it is beneficial for a firm to commit to being a less vigorous 
competitor, since such a commitment induces other competitors to 
compete less vigorously themselves.62 
Therefore, the very same "agency costs" stemming from GM's 
stake in Avis, in the current context, tend to benefit National's minor­
ity shareholders. This is because these "agency problems" may enable 
60. Our numerical example demonstrated how, when GM disregarded the profits flow­
ing to National's minority shareholders, dilution of GM's stake in National made GM place 
more weight on its stake in Avis. This strengthened GM's tendency to run National as a Jess 
vigorous competitor. If GM maximized the total value of National, including the profits that 
belong to National's minority shareholders, GM's stake in National would not possess an 
additional competition-reducing effect. To illustrate, suppose GM maximizes National's to­
tal profits, including the profits flowing to National's minority shareholders. Accordingly, if 
GM makes National price cut, National (as a whole) loses $3. Since GM is assumed here to 
maximize National's total value, GM will compare the $3 with 25% of $8, which is $2 (GM's 
stake in Avis's losses due to National's price cut). Accordingly, GM would still make Na­
tional price cut, despite GM's stake in Avis. This conclusion would be true regardless of 
GM's stake in National. 
61. In particular, following the analysis of Section l.C.1 above, if National is inherently 
more "trigger-happy" than its competitors (e.g., due to a cost advantage, to a small market 
share, or to having larger buyers or more infrequent sales), National's observed trigger­
happiness might make collusion unsustainable. National's rivals would not charge a high 
collusive price to begin with, since they would fear that National would undercut it anyway. 
National would thus want to commit not to price cut, in order to reassure its rivals, induce 
them to charge a collusive price to begin with, and facilitate collusion in the industry. 
62. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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National to earn supracompetitive profits. Accordingly, if GM makes 
National compete less vigorously due to GM's stake in Avis, it would 
be difficult to claim that GM is in breach of its fiduciary duty toward 
National. As shown above, such behavior on the part of GM might be 
beneficial to National, and to its minority shareholders. 
Moreover, suppose that, in the above-mentioned numerical exam­
ple, GM, which holds 55% of National and had invested in 25% of 
Avis, causes National not to price cut. Suppose now that the minority 
shareholders of National claim that GM has breached its fiduciary 
duty. In particular, their claim is that GM caused National not to price 
cut so as to protect GM's own investment in Avis, and that GM disre­
garded the interests of National's minority shareholders. These mi­
nority shareholders would find it extremely hard to prove in court that 
GM's conduct was not the optimal strategy for National. GM can 
claim that National is, in fact, managed competitively. For example, it 
can explain that a price cut by National is not optimal given the level 
of demand and National's costs. National's minority shareholders 
would find it extremely difficult to prove otherwise. 
In summary, when a firm's controller (be it a parent corporation or 
an individual) invests in the firm's competitor, in addition to the con­
troller's stake in the competitor, the controller's stake in the firm it 
controls becomes important. The smaller the controller's stake in the 
firm it controls, the less aggressively will the controller cause the firm 
it controls to compete. This is because, the smaller the controller's 
stake in the firm it controls, the more weight the controller places on 
its stake in the competing firm.63 This further implies that even rela­
tively small stakes the controller holds in the competing firm could 
substantially lessen competition if the controller has a diluted stake in 
the firm it controls. 
The analysis of passive investment by a firm's controlling share­
holder in the firm's competitor is directly analogous to passive invest­
ment by a firm's manager in the firm's competitor. Suppose, in our car 
rental example, that National's CEO holds Avis stock. As a result, if 
the CEO makes an aggressive competitive move (e.g., makes National 
price cut), this harms Avis, and reduces the value of the CEO's in­
vestment in A vis. Therefore, holding A vis stock will cause the CEO to 
manage National as a less vigorous competitor. This case is analogous 
63. For a formal model, see Gilo, supra note 23, which deals with the tacit collusion 
case. The same reasoning applies to the anticompetitive effects of passive investment that 
exist without collusion (analyzed in Section LB). Reynolds & Snapp, supra note 23, reach 
similar results, presenting a model of a joint venture framework where controlling parents of 
joint venture plants invest in competing joint venture plants. They do not, however, consider 
the possibility of controllers strategically diluting their stakes in the firms they control to fur­
ther reduce competition. As shown in Gilo, supra note 23, controllers can do this by selling 
out part of their firm to public shareholders or other passive investors. 
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to the case in which GM (National's controlling shareholder) holds 
Avis stock. 
The discussion of passive investment by a controlling shareholder 
revealed how the smaller the controller's stake in the firm it controls 
the stronger the controller's commitment to run the firm under its con­
trol less competitively. A manager who is not a controlling share­
holder might have a very small "stake" in the firm she manages (in the 
form of stock, options, or compensation components that are posi­
tively linked to the firm's profits). In such a case, even very small 
stakes held by the manager in competing firms will suffice to substan­
tially lessen competition.64 Furthermore, in cases in which competitors 
can observe that the manager holds a stake in a competitor, such a 
stake can induce competitors to compete less vigorously themselves.65 
Similarly, components in executive compensation packages that 
are positively linked to industry or competitors' profitability might be 
anticompetitive. If the manager makes the firm under her control 
compete vigorously (e.g., by price cutting) all competitors' profits will 
be reduced. A reduction in competitors' profits will lead to a decrease 
in the value of those components in the manager's compensation 
package that are positively linked to industry or competitors' profit­
ability.66 This will induce the manager to make the firm under her con­
trol compete less vigorously.67 
As illustrated above, such a commitment by the firm to compete 
less aggressively can be valuable to the firm, since it can induce com­
peting firms to compete less aggressively themselves. In this sense, 
such compensation packages for managers increase the firm's profits 
and are beneficial to the firm's shareholders.68 Furthermore, as in the 
64. See infra text accompanying note 71 (numerical example). 
65. If the stake the manager holds in a competitor is very small, however, competitors 
might not observe such holdings. In such a case, even if this small holding in a competitor 
induces the manager to compete less vigorously, it nevertheless will not induce competitors 
to compete less vigorously themselves. Even if the manager somehow makes her holdings 
known to competitors, they might fear that the manager will secretly sell the stock she holds 
in a competitor just before making an aggressive competitive move. This point will be fur­
ther addressed infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
66. When components of a manager's compensation are positively linked to the profit­
ability of the industry as a whole, it is as if the manager holds stakes in each of the firm's 
competitors (as well as in the firm she manages). As shown in the analysis of investment by a 
firm's manager in the firm's competitor, having a stake in competing firms will cause the 
manager to manage the firm as a less vigorous competitor. This will be further illustrated, 
through an example, in the text below. 
67. For an economic model, see Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, Executive 
Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and 
Evidence, 54 J. FIN. 1999 (1999); Gilo, supra note 23, at Section 2.2.2.B. 
68. To be sure, the firm would not want its manager to prefer competitors' success over 
the success of the firm she manages. All the firm might want is credibly to show competitors 
that it is willing to be a less vigorous competitor. Accordingly, firms would never want to 
give their managers compensation packages which make them have a larger "stake" in com­
petitors than in the firms they manage. However, they might want to make their managers 
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case with passive investment by controllers,69 the smaller the "stake" a 
manager has in the firm she manages (in the form of stock, options, or 
compensation components positively linked to the firm's profitability) 
the stronger the anticompetitive effect. This is because the smaller the 
manager's "stake" in the firm she manages, the more weight the man­
ager will place on her "stake" (via components of her compensation 
package that are positively linked to industry or competitors' profit­
ability) in competing firms. This further implies that for very small 
stakes that the manager holds in the firm she manages, even compo­
nents in her compensation package with a very weak positive linkage 
to industry or competitors' profitability might make the manager run 
the firm much less vigorously.70 Let us illustrate this by way of the fol­
lowing example: 
Suppose National has a manager who is given stock, options, and 
other incentives equivalent to a 1 % share of National's stock. Sup­
pose, as before, that National can make $3 from an aggressive com­
petitive action, such as price cutting, and that A vis loses $8 from 
National's aggressive behavior. Suppose now that there is another 
component in the manager's compensation package that is positively 
linked to the industry's or Avis's profits. For example, assume that the 
manager, as part of her compensation, receives industry index options 
that grant her 0.7% worth of the aggregate profits of firms in the in­
dustry. Even if Avis is National's only competitor, this would be 
enough to make the manager refrain from price cutting. Under such a 
compensation scheme, although the manager makes $0.03 (1 % of $3) 
from National's price cut (due to components in her compensation 
package that are positively linked to National's profits), she loses 
0.7% of $5 (the industry's aggregate loss from National's price cut),71 
which is $0.035 (due to the industry index options included in the 
manager's compensation package). Accordingly, the manager will re­
frain from making National price cut (since $0.035 is greater than 
$0.03).72 
care, to a certain extent, about competitors' profits. For example, a firm might want to give 
its manager options and stock in the firm equivalent to a 1 % stake in the firm, while includ­
ing in her compensation package components that are positively linked to competitors' 
profits and are equivalent to a 0.5% "stake" in a competing firm. 
69. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
70. As with passive investment by controllers, here too what drives the anticompetitive 
effect is that the manager takes her own interests into account and disregards the firm's 
profits while running the firm. See supra notes 29, 60-61 and accompanying text. Here too, 
what is conventionally thought of as an "agency cost," turns out, in the current context, to be 
beneficial to the firm's shareholders. 
71. The industry's aggregate loss from National's price cut is $8 (Avis's losses) minus $3 
(National's gains), which is $5. 
72. As in the case of passive investment in Avis by National, or by National's controlling 
shareholder, National's commitment to be a less vigorous competitor may induce Avis to 
compete less vigorously. 
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The fact that a firm can replicate the anticompetitive effect of pas­
sive investment in a competitor by employing such executive compen­
sation schemes is important from a legal policy perspective. If such ex­
ecutive compensation schemes are held to be legal, while only 
anticompetitive passive investment is prohibited, firms could legiti­
mately use such compensation schemes to achieve the same anticom­
petitive effect as that achieved by passive investment. Therefore, 
sound legal policy should prohibit the use of such executive compensa­
tion schemes where they might, according to the analysis presented 
here, substantially lessen competition. This becomes of particular im­
portance if we consider managers who hold relatively small "stakes" in 
the firms they manage. As mentioned above, for relatively small 
"stakes" the manager holds in the firm under her control, even a small 
degree of positive linkage between components in her compensation 
package and industry or competitors' profitability will suffice to in­
duce her to manage the firm much less competitively.73 
It should further be noted that, in order for components in an ex­
ecutive compensation package to make the firm credibly commit to 
becoming a less vigorous competitor, such components usually need to 
be observable to competitors.74 In the case of publicly traded corpora­
tions, which must, under securities regulation, publicly disclose execu­
tive compensation schemes and their components,75 such components 
are indeed observable. This is not usually the case however, in closely 
held firms, in which executive compensation schemes are not subject 
to disclosure requirements. Accordingly, in closely held firms, compo­
nents of executive compensation packages that are positively linked to 
industry or competitors' profitability generally cannot induce rivals to 
compete less vigorously themselves. Even if a closely held firm volun­
tarily publishes its managers' compensation packages, this would not 
suffice to reassure competitors that the firm would indeed conduct it­
self as a less vigorous competitor from that point on. The firm's rivals 
would know that at any time the firm could secretly change its manag­
ers' compensation schemes so as to induce its managers to compete 
aggressively. 76 
73. For an empirical study showing a positive relation between executives' long-term 
total compensation and competing firm's performance, see Aggarwal & Samwick, supra note 
67. Aggarwal & Samwick's study deals with executives' total compensation. It is much more 
difficult, however, to find examples of executive compensation contracts that include com­
ponents that are positively linked to rivals' performance. 
74. The requirement is usually fulfilled with regard to substantial levels of passive in­
vestment by a firm (or by its controlling shareholder) in a competitor. See supra note 48. 
75. See SEC Regulation S-K, item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2000). 
76. To be sure, even when the firm is closely held, and its executive compensation 
schemes are unobservable to rivals, such compensation schemes may nevertheless harm 
competition. As long as components that are positively linked to industry or competitors' 
profits are part of executive compensation packages, they will induce managers to manage 
their firms less competitively. In a market with only a few firms, when a firm behaves less 
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Legal Treatment of Passive Investment - the "Solely for 
Investment" Exemption 
Acquisition of another firm's stock has traditionally been treated 
under section 7 of the Clayton Act,77 which condemns acquisitions of 
"the whole or any part of the stock" of another firm where "the effect 
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition . . . .  " 
The third paragraph of this section, however, includes the following 
exemption: 
This section shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock solely for 
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, 
or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. 
This exemption (referred to hereinafter as the "solely for invest­
ment" exemption) demands a two pronged test.78 The first prong con­
sists of a determination of whether the acquisition of the stock was 
made "solely for investment." If the first prong is satisfied and it is de­
termined that the acquisition was made "solely for investment," the 
acquisition will not be examined according to the-main-effects-clause 
of section 7 of the Clayton Act (which asks whether the acquisition 
"may substantially lessen competition"). Instead, the acquisition will 
be examined according to the second prong of the "solely for invest­
ment" exemption. As the Anaconda Court put it: 
In cases where the "solely for investment" exemption does not apply, a 
plaintiff need only show a reasonable probability of a lessening of com­
petition . . . .  Thus, the anti-competitive effects may be attacked in their 
incipiency. The statutory exemption, however, conspicuously omits this 
language. Once it is established to the satisfaction of the Court that the 
acquisition is "solely for investment," the statute requires a showing that 
the defendant is "using the [stock] by voting or otherwise to bring about, 
competitively (e.g., reduces output), the market becomes less competitive overall. See Sec­
tion LB (analyzing the case without collusion). 
Furthermore, as Aggarwal & Samwick show, even when managers' contracts are unob­
servable, in certain cases, managers can credibly signal the fact that their compensation 
packages include components that are positively linked to rivals' profitability. See supra note 
67, at 2036-41 .  Aggarwal & Samwick use a game-theoretical model to show how through cer­
tain actions, such as investment or product market decisions, a manager could send such sig­
nals to managers of rival firms. 
77. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). It is widely acknowledged that section 7 of the Clayton Act 
applies to stock acquisitions even when control is not obtained by the acquiring firm. See, 
e.g. , Denver & Rio Grande W. RR. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 501 (1967); Unites States 
v. E.1. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). 
78. See United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1979); 
Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Janet H. Winningham, 
"Solely for Investment Purposes": Evolution of a Statutory Exemption Under Clayton Section 
7, 12 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571 (1981). 
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or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competi­
tion.79 
Although the language of the second prong is quite vague, in order 
to give it any meaning, it is clear that it involves a more lenient test 
than section 7's main-effects clause. Otherwise, the "solely for invest­
ment" exemption would be superfluous.80 The meaning given to this 
second prong by the case law is that it requires the plaintiff to show 
evidence of an actual lessening of competition. This is in contrast to 
the general test of section 7 of the Clayton Act, according to which it is 
enough if the plaintiff shows probable tendencies to lessen competi­
tion.81 
As to the first prong of the "solely for investment" exemption, re­
quiring a determination as to whether the acquisition is "solely for in­
vestment," the leading cases have equated an acquisition of stock be­
ing "solely for investment" to its being "passive." According to the 
leading case law, if an acquisition of stock is totally passive (i.e., the 
acquirer of the stock will not gain influence over the actions of the 
firm in which the investment was made, or access to the firm's sensi­
tive information), it will be considered to be "solely for investment."82 
In the above-mentioned Gillette case,83 for example, the Department 
of Justice decided not to attack Gillette's passive investment in 
Wilkinson Sword, implying that the investment, due to its passive na­
ture, enjoys the "solely for investment" exemption.84 Conversely, an 
79. 411 F. Supp. at 1219 (internal citations omitted); see also Penn. R.R. Co. v. ICC, 66 
F.2d 37, 39-40 (3d Cir. 1933), affd mem. by an equally divided court, 291 U.S. 651 (1934); 
Tracinda, 477 F. Supp. at 1097, 1 102 n.10. 
80. The court acknowledged this in Tracinda, 477 F. Supp. at 1093, 1099 n.5. 
81. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) ("[Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act] can deal only with probabilities, not with certainties. And there is certainly no 
requirement that the anticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action before 
[section] 7 can be called into play. If enforcement of [section] 7 turned on the existence of 
actual anticompetitive practices, the congressional policy of thwarting such practices in their 
incipiency would be frustrated.") (citations omitted); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 323, 343, 346 (1962); Du Pont, 353 U.S. at 589; Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 
F.2d 1368, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1978); Pennsylvania R.R., 66 F.2d at 39-40; Tracinda, 477 F. 
Supp. at 1 102 n.10 ("In the substantive provisions of the first two paragraphs of Section 7, 
Congress showed concern for the probable future consequences of the acquisition by utiliz­
ing the language 'may be substantially to lessen competition.' On the other hand, with the 
investment exemption, Congress exhibited a concern for the past and present effect of the 
acquisition by utilizing the language 'and not using the same . . .  to bring about . . .  the sub­
stantial lessening of competition. ' "); Anaconda, 411 F. Supp. at 1219. 
82. Tracinda, 477 F. Supp. at 1098 ("The ultimate definitive factor the courts have 
looked to . . .  is whether the stock was purchased for the purpose of taking over the active 
management and control of the acquired company."); Anaconda, 411 F. Supp. at 1218-19; 
United States v. Amax Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956, 974 (D. Conn. 1975); United States v. Gillette 
Co., 55 Fed. Reg. 28,312 (July 10, 1990). 
83. 55 Fed. Reg. at 28,312. The facts of this case are described supra note 7 and accom­
panying text. 
84. Id. at 28,322-23. 
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acquisition of stock will not be considered "solely for investment" if 
the acquirer intends, through the acquisition, to obtain active control 
of the firm in which the investment was made.85 In addition, this first 
prong will not be satisfied, even in certain cases in which control is not 
achieved by the acquisition, if the acquirer of the stock intends to ob­
tain control in the future86 or at least gain some degree of influence 
over the actions of the firm in which the investment was made (for ex­
ample, through the right to eleet a member of the board).87 Similarly, 
the first prong will not be satisfied in cases where the acquirer of the 
stock can use its position as stockholder to access sensitive informa­
tion regarding the activities of the firm in which the investment was 
made.88 
Therefore, the leading cases, in their application of the "solely for 
investment" exemption's first prong, focus on the question of whether 
the acquirer of the stock could gain influence over the firm in which 
the investment was made. A totally passive stock acquisition will be 
exempt from a full-blown examination as to whether it might (in the 
probabilistic sense) substantially lessen competition. Instead, the pas­
sive stock acquisition will be examined under the much more lenient 
second prong test.89 
B. The De Facto Exemption Granted to Passive Investment 
by the Leading Cases 
As Part I illustrated in detail, even absolutely passive investment in 
a competitor, in an industry with only a few firms, may have substan­
tial anticompetitive effects. As Section l.B demonstrated, even with-
85. See, e.g. , Tracinda, 477 F. Supp. at 1098.; Anaconda, 411 F. Supp. at 1218-19; Amax, 
402 F. Supp. at 974. 
86. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 315-16 (D.Conn. 1953), 
aff d, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). 
87. See Unites States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589-93, 597-98 
(1957); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 556 (N.D. Ill. 1968); 
Hamilton Watch, 114 F. Supp. at 317. 
88. See F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
89. See supra note 81, and accompanying text. AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 23, at § 
1204, take a different approach. They argue that the "solely for investment" exemption is 
superfluous. As they explain, "[t]he 'true exception' issue would squarely arise only in an 
acquisition that is deemed both (a) to be solely for investment and (b) to have a probable 
anticompetitive effect. But there could be no such case if the acquirer were presumed to in­
tend the probable consequences of his act." Id. at 325. Their reasoning, as the authors right­
fully state, reflects that of the FfC decision, Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63 
(1971), modified in other respects, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972), discussed infra Section 11.C. 
As demonstrated in this Article, however, the bulk of the case law dealing with the "solely 
for investment" exemption does not follow this approach. See, e.g. , Denison Mines v. Michi­
gan Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania R.R v. ICC. , 66 F.2d 37, 
40 (3d Cir. 1933); Tracinda, 477 F. Supp. at 1098-1099; Anaconda, 411 F. Supp. at 1218. 
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out considering ongoing collusion, passive investment among competi­
tors makes the market less competitive: prices are higher and quanti­
ties smaller. Furthermore, passive investment can be used to facilitate 
collusion, as shown in Section l.C. Finally, Section l.D illustrated how 
these anticompetitive effects are exacerbated in the case of passive in­
vestment by controllers. 
In contrast, as Section II.A revealed, the leading cases have consis­
tently ruled that a stock acquisition that is totally passive is to be con­
sidered "solely for investment." As such, passive stock acquisitions, 
according to these leading cases, satisfy the first prong of the "solely 
for investment" exemption, and are eligible for a more lenient test 
than the main effects clause of section 7 of the Clayton Act.90 Accord­
ing to this more lenient test, only the question of whether the passive 
stock acquisition possesses actual (rather than probabilistic) anticom­
petitive effects is examined.91 
Unfortunately, however, the anticompetitive effects of passive in­
vestment, identified in Part I, are probabilistic in nature, and are very 
hard to detect or prove.92 Thus, the leading cases' interpretation grants 
a de facto exemption to passive stock acquisitions. In particular, the 
anticompetitive effect of passive investment in reducing quantities and 
raising prices, where there is no ongoing collusion in the industry, is 
very hard to detect or prove. Quantities and prices might change due 
to an array of benign industry factors, such as shifts in costs or de­
mands. Constant scrutiny by courts over industry quantities and prices 
would turn courts into price regulators, which they are not. The same 
is true, to a great extent, with regard to the effect of passive invest­
ment in facilitating tacit collusion. Tacit collusion consists of unilateral 
behavior that is not accompanied by any form of agreement between 
the parties. Courts and agencies would find it difficult to detect tacit 
collusion and prove its existence. 
An additional tension between the case law and the analysis pre­
sented here exists with regard to the acquisition of a competitor's 
debt. As shown in Section l.C.2 above, acquisition of a competitor's 
debt, in certain cases, may facilitate collusion. In those antitrust cases 
in which a firm acquired debt in its competitor, as in the leading cases 
concerning stock acquisition, there has been no discussion of this anti-
90. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1994). 
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
92. The anticompetitive effects of passive investment are, in this sense, similar to the 
anticompetitive effects feared in full-blown mergers. In the context of mergers, it was pre­
cisely the probabilistic nature of these anticompetitive effects that caused courts to rule con­
sistently that section 7 of the Clayton Act "can deal only with probabilities, not with certain­
ties." FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967). Mergers, obviously, do not 
qualify for the "solely for investment" exemption. They are therefore scrutinized under the 
main-effects clause of section 7 of the Clayton Act, which has been construed as condemning 
even probabilistic (and not only actual) anticompetitive effects. See supra note 81. 
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competitive effect. In debt cases the courts have focused only on 
whether the creditor would attempt to exert its influence on the 
debtor through its position as creditor.93 None of these cases addresses 
the concerns raised in this Article. 
C. An Alternative Interpretation of the "Solely for 
Investment" Exemption 
The interpretation given to the "solely for investment" exemption 
in the leading cases is unwarranted because it fails to address the anti­
competitive effects of passive investment. The "solely for investment" 
exemption can, and should, be construed differently, to take account 
of these anticompetitive effects. 
The main flaw in the leading cases cited in Section II.A is that they 
seem to be concerned only with the active influence the acquirer of 
the stock might gain over the behavior of the firm in which the in­
vestment was made. The leading cases neglect the effect stock acquisi­
tion will have on the stock acquirer itself, namely, making the stock 
acquirer a less vigorous competitor. The leading cases presume that 
passive stock acquisitions are necessarily "solely for investment" pur­
poses. The analysis in Part I shows that this is not the case. Even to­
tally passive stock acquisitions may be used strategically by the stock 
acquirer as a commitment device to reduce competition. Such passive 
stock acquisitions are therefore not "solely for investment" purposes 
and do not qualify for the exemption. 
For example, in the Gillette case,94 discussed above, Gillette, the in­
ternational and U.S. leader in the wet shaving razor blade market, had 
purchased 22.9% of the nonvoting stock and approximately 13.6% of 
the debt of Wilkinson Sword, one of Gillette's major competitors, in a 
highly concentrated industry. The Department of Justice, assured by a 
consent decree95 that the investment would be totally passive, decided 
not to attack the transaction, citing the " 'passive investment' excep­
tion. "96 The DOJ failed to address the anticompetitive effects that 
might be inherent in such a passive stock acquisition. In this case a 
large stake was acquired, the industry included only a few firms, and 
the parties to the transaction were large firms (the investor was the in-
93. See Mr. Frank, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 859, 862, 867 (N.D. Ill. 1984); 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); 
United States v. Gillette Co., 55 Fed. Reg. 28,312 (July 10, 1990). It appears from the facts of 
MGM that there was sufficient collateral to guarantee the loan even in the case of the 
debtor's insolvency. 303 F. Supp. at 1347. As discussed in Section I.C.2 supra, acquisition of 
the competitor's debt raises less antitrust concern in such a case. None of this was discussed, 
however, by the court. 
94. 55 Fed. Reg. at 28,312. 
95. United States v. Gillette Co., 1990 WL 126485 (D.D.C. July 25, 1990). 
96. 55 Fed. Reg. at 28,322-23 (using the DOJ's terminology). 
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dustry's leader and the firm in which the investment was made was 
one of its largest competitors.) According to the analysis of Part I, all 
of these characteristics suggest a substantial anticompetitive effect.97 
Similarly, the Time Warner-Turner Broadcasting merger granted 
TCI (then the nation's largest cable operator) a 9% stake in Time 
Warner (the nation's second-largest cable operator). The Federal 
Trade Commission, assured that TCI would remain a passive investor, 
approved this stake, and also made it possible for TCI to increase its 
stake in Time Warner to 14.99% in the future.98 The Federal Trade 
Commission failed to address the anticompetitive effect that is the fo­
cus of this Article.99 TCI and Time Warner compete with each other 
(through subsidiaries controlled by them) in the cable programming 
market. For example, TCI controls movie networks Starz and Encore 
while Time Warner controls movie networks HBO and Cinemax.100 
The analysis of Section l.D above suggests that TCI might cause Starz 
and Encore to become less aggressive competitors, due to TCl's pas­
sive stake in Time Warner.101 Furthermore, TCl's commitment might 
induce competing movie networks to compete less vigorously them­
selves.102 Our analysis also suggests that the fact TCI holds less than 
100% of Starz and Encore exacerbates this effect. Moreover, if TCI 
dilutes its stake in Starz and Encore in the future below the current 
80% TCI will place more weight on its passive stake in Time Warner 
and the anticompetitive effect will be even stronger.103 
TCI and Time Warner are also potential competitors in the cable 
operating market. Many local cable operating markets that were pre­
viously regulated monopolies are now open to competition. If a local 
market in which Time Warner, for example, is a monopoly, is deregu­
lated and opened to competition from other cable operators, TCl's 
stake in Time Warner might cause TCI to refrain from entering such a 
97. This is not to say that a substantial anticompetitive effect should be presumed in 
such cases. Rather, there should have been an investigation as to whether such an anticom­
petitive effect is probable. 
98. Proposed Consent Agreement, Time Warner, Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. 50,301 (Sept. 25, 
1996). 
99. The only anticompetitive concern resulting from TCl's stake in Time Warner that 
was addressed by the FTC was the fear that TCI would use its position as cable operator to 
forestall entry of programmers that are potential competitors to Time Warner in the cable 
programming field. Id. at 50,308. 
100. Since Time Warner owns 100% of HBO and Cinemax, this is an example of passive 
investment by a firm's controller (TCI, controlling Starz and Encore) in a 9% stake (and, 
possibly, a 14.99% stake) of the firm's competitor (HBO and Cinemax). 
101. Even assuming Starz and Encore are managed independently, their managers are 
expected to take account of TCl's interests, since TCI is their controlling shareholder. See 
supra note 56. 
102. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
103. See supra Section l.D. 
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market. This is because such entry would lower the value of TCI's 
stake in Time Warner. TCI may well prefer to enter other local mar­
kets, in which Time Warner is not operating. The U.S. cable operator 
market is extremely concentrated, with TCI serving (at the time of the 
FfC's decision) approximately 27% and Time Warner serving ap­
proximately 17% of all cable television households in the U.S.104 Ac­
cordingly, the analysis of Part I implies that TCI's passive stake in 
Time Warner might make TCI compete less vigorously in the cable 
operator market (e.g., by refraining from entering into local markets 
dominated by Time Warner.) Moreover, TCI's commitment not to en­
ter Time Warner's markets might induce Time Warner not to enter 
TCI's markets.105 Finally, even if TCI or Time Warner were to enter 
each other's local markets, the analyses of Sections LB and l.C.1.a 
suggest that TCI's stake in Time Warner would tend to raise prices 
and facilitate collusion. 
Another example in which antitrust agencies have neglected the 
anticompetitive effect of passive investment is the recent merger be­
tween Medtronic, Inc. and Physio-Control International Corporation 
(referred to hereinafter as "Physio"). Medtronic has an ownership in­
terest slightly below 10% in SurVivaLink Corporation, which is one of 
Physio's only two competitors in the market for the research, devel­
opment, manufacture and sale of Automated External Defibrilla­
tors.106 The Federal Trade Commission agreed to a consent decree al-
104. Other cable operators were significantly smaller. Data from November, 1995, re­
veal that, apart from TCI and Time Warner, there were four cable operators servicing be­
tween 4.6% and 5.9% of total U.S. cable households and six servicing between 1.8% and 
2.7% of total cable households. DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION IN CABLE TELEVISION, 35-37 (1997). Although the cable programming indus­
try seems less concentrated, see id. at 24-32, it is clear from the FTC's Time Warner decision 
that the FTC was concerned with this industry's concentration level. First, it was immensely 
worried that the Time Warner - Turner Broadcasting merger would deter new entry into the 
programming market. Accordingly, it made provisions, in the consent decree approving the 
merger, to assure that Time Warner's cable operating arm accommodate new entry into the 
cable programming industry. Time Warner Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. 50,301, 50,313 (Sept. 25, 1996). 
Second, the FTC was concerned that Time Warner's cable programming arm would harm 
potential competition in the multi-channel operating industry by price discriminating against 
new entrants, such as direct broadcast satellite providers ("DBS"). Hence it included anti­
discrimination provisions in the consent decree. Both of these concerns imply that the FTC 
views the cable programming market as concentrated. Had the FTC believed there were 
enough viable competitors in this market, it would not have been concerned with new entry. 
Similarly, it would not have been concerned with price discrimination against new entrants 
into the multichannel operating industry, such as DBS, since, if the merged Time Warner -
Turner entity would have tried to discriminate against them, they could have contracted with 
some of the many other viable cable programming networks. Accordingly, the FTC should 
have been equally concerned with the anticompetitive effect of TCI's passive stake in Time 
Warner on the cable programming market, as identified here. 
105. The analysis here is analogous to that of price competition. See supra Sections LB, 
note 29 and accompanying text, and Section l.C.l.a. 
106. Automated External Defibrillators are "portable, automated devices, used in 
emergency situations, by persons with limited medical training, such as policemen, firemen 
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lowing the merger, provided that Medtronic's stake in SurVivaLink 
become completely passive.107 
Although the size of Medtronic's stake in SurVivaLink is relatively 
small, the analysis provided in this Article suggests that the anticom­
petitive effects of passive investment should have been at least ex­
plored by the FfC. The FfC stresses that the relevant market in this 
case is extremely concentrated, with only three significant players. The 
Commission described barriers to entry into the relevant market as 
particularly high and the industry was described by the Commission as 
especially prone to collusive behavior and supracompetitive pricing. 
The Commission also expressed fear that without the above­
mentioned consent decree, competition with regard to innovation 
would be lessened.108 In such an industry, as shown in Part I above, 
even if Medtronic remains a totally passive investor in SurVivaLink, 
similar anticompetitive threats, of supracompetitive pricing and collu­
sion, as well as less competition with regard to innovation, still re­
mained and required further examination. 
This is particularly true since, after the merger, Medtronic is the 
parent corporation of Physio, which is SurVivaLink's competitor. 
Hence, Medtronic's stake in SurVivaLink is an instance of passive in­
vestment by a controller. As Section l.D demonstrated, if Medtronic 
were, in the future, to dilute its stake in Physio (e.g., by selling part of 
Physio's stock to public shareholders, or other minority shareholders), 
Medtronic would then place more weight on its passive stake in 
SurVivaLink, and would thus exacerbate the anticompetitive threat 
arising from this stake. Accordingly, even if the Commission believed 
that Medtronic's passive stake in SurVivaLink was, at the time, too 
small to raise antitrust concern, it should have at least stipulated, in 
the consent decree, that any dilution of Medtronic's stake in Physio, 
the firm under its control, should be subject to prior notification to the 
Commission.109 As Section l.D illustrated, such dilution strengthens 
the anticompetitive effect of passive investment just as an increase in 
the passive stake itself does. 
In an industry with only a few firms, when one firm makes a sig­
nificant (although passive) "investment" in a major competitor, this 
firm cannot claim that the acquisition of the stock is "solely for in-
and lifeguards, to treat people suffering from sudden cardiac arrest." Medtronic, Inc., 63 
Fed. Reg. 53,919-20 (Oct. 7, 1998). 
107. Id. at 53,920 ("The proposed Consent Order remedies the acquisition's anticom­
petitive effects in the market for automated external defibrillators by making Medtronic a 
passive investor in SurVivaLink . . . .  "). 
108. Id. 
109. While the Commission demanded prior notification of any increase in Medtronic's 
stake in SurVivaLink, it did not demand similar notification with regard to dilution of 
Medtronic's stake in Physio. Id. 
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vestment." Such a stock acquisition does not qualify for the "solely for 
investment" exemption, because, as shown in Part I, it enables the ac­
quirer of the stock to make a commitment to compete less vigorously. 
Such a commitment might induce other competitors to behave less 
competitively themselves. Therefore, such a stock acquisition must be 
scrutinized under the main effects clause of section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.110 That is, there must be a full-blown investigation of market con­
ditions to establish whether the stock acquisition, although passive, 
may (in the probabilistic sense) substantially lessen competition.111 
One of two decisions which has touched upon these policy con­
cerns is the Federal Trade Commission's decision in Golden Grain 
Macaroni Co.,112 in which the FTC condemned a 49% stake that 
Golden Grain Macaroni held in Porter Scarpelli, its largest competi­
tor.113 The decision states: 
[G]iven the relationship of the firms involved here (i.e., major competi­
tors in an oligopolistically structured market) and [Golden Grain's] per­
centage of ownership in Porter-Scarpelli (i.e. , 49% ) , the acquisition was 
bound to affect the operations of [Golden Grain] in a way that an acqui­
sition made "solely" for investment would not. [Golden Grain] can rea­
sonably be expected to hesitate in engaging in vigorous competition with 
Porter Scarpelli as it might jeopardize [its] investment.114 
Surprisingly, this example is one of only two cases that demon­
strates an understanding of the anticompetitive effects involved in pas­
sive investment. The decision, almost 30 years old and for the most 
part ignored by courts and antitrust agencies, acknowledges that when 
a firm holds a stake in a competitor, in a market with only a few firms, 
this might make the firm holding such a stake compete less vigorously. 
Such an effect, as the decision states, makes the acquisition unquali­
fied for the "solely for investment" exemption. It should be stressed, 
however, that in the Golden Grain case the Commission, in its deci­
sion, was also driven by the fear that Golden Grain would acquire con­
trol in the future, given that it already held the substantial stake of 
49%.115 
Furthermore, the strategic motivation that drives a firm to commit 
to becoming a less vigorous competitor ex ante (namely, committing 
to compete less aggressively in order to induce competitors to com­
pete less aggressively themselves) is not discussed in the decision. This 
110. 15 u.s.c. § 18 (1994). 
111 .  The economic analysis of Part I provides some guidelines to assist in such an ex­
amination. 
1 12. 78 F.T.C. 63 (1971), modified in other respects, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972). 
1 13. The evidence supported the conclusion that Golden Grain was a passive investor. 
Id. at 76. 
1 14. Id. at 172. 
1 15. Id. 
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strategic motivation, identified in this Article,116 is important to em­
phasize when discussing the "solely for investment" exemption. With­
out acknowledging this strategic motivation, one might claim that al­
though passive investment may have an incidental anticompetitive 
effect, it is motivated solely by investment considerations, and not by 
anticompetitive ones. It is plausible to claim that the acquisition is 
thereby deemed "solely for investment" and is eligible for the exemp­
tion. However, once we acknowledge the strategic anticompetitive 
motivation behind passive investment (i.e., inducing competitors to 
compete less vigorously themselves), it will be easier for a plaintiff to 
claim that the acquisition is not solely for investment, and is therefore 
outside the scope of the exemption. 
The second instance found in the case law acknowledging the anti­
competitive effect of passive investment is the consent decree reached 
with the Department of Justice with regard to U S  West's acquisition 
of Continental Cablevision.117 Continental, at the time of the consent 
agreement, owned 11  % of Teleport Communications Group 
("TCG"). TCG competed with U S West in several telecommunica­
tion markets, including the market for the sale of dedicated services118 
in various locations. Pursuant to the consent decree, the 
U S  West - Continental merger was to be approved subject to divesti­
ture of Continental's ownership interest in TCG.119 The Department of 
Justice, in the competitive impact statement supporting the consent 
decree, stated: 
U S West's competitive strategy, including its pricing and output deci­
sions, will be influenced by its partial ownership of a significant direct 
competitor. Because of its partial ownership of TCG, losses of customers 
to TCG would not be as detrimental to U S  West, and it would have less 
incentive to lower prices or interest quality to meet with the emerging 
competition from CAPs in these areas.120 
As in the Golden Grain decision, the Department of Justice does 
not mention the strategic motivation for passive investment, namely, 
that U S West's commitment to behave less competitively might in­
duce U S West's competitors to behave less competitively themselves. 
116. See supra Sections l.A-1.C. 
1 17. United States v. U S  West, Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. 58,703 (Nov. 18, 1996). 
1 18. Dedicated services include "special access" and "local private line services." Id. at 
58,708. "Special access" is "the provision of dedicated lines carrying traffic from the prem­
ises of high-volume end-users to the end-user's long distance carrier, or between a given long 
distance carrier's points-of-presence"; "local private line services" are "dedicated lines con­
necting multiple locations of an end-user within a given metropolitan area." Id. at 58,708. 
1 19. The consent decree was approved by the district court in United States v. U S 
West, Inc., 1997-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 'lI 71,767 (D.C. 1997). 
120. Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. at 
58,708. The "solely for investment" exemption was not mentioned. 
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It is important to stress this strategic effect, since otherwise it might 
seem unconvincing that U S West would want to enter a transaction 
that would make it compete less aggressively and lose business to its 
rivals. 
D. Unilateral Passive Investment by a "Maverick" Firm 
Another important policy implication of Part l's economic analysis 
is that passive investment by a firm that is inherently a more aggres­
sive competitor raises particular antitrust concern. As shown in Sec­
tion I.C.1 above, such passive investment can be strategically used to 
facilitate collusion. Conversely, when the investing firm is not inher­
ently more aggressive than its rivals, the investment raises less anti­
trust concern. In the latter case, although the anticompetitive effects 
of passive investment that occur without collusion remain intact,121 the 
investment will not facilitate collusion, unless all firms in the industry 
have passively invested in competitors. Accordingly, courts and anti­
trust agencies examining a particular case of passive investment in a 
competitor should try to verify whether the investing firm is an inher­
ently more aggressive competitor than its rivals (say, for example, due 
to a cost advantage, or being better able to make secret price cuts). 
Such an investment is potentially more harmful to competition than an 
investment by a firm that is not inherently more aggressive than its ri­
vals. 
In the context of horizontal mergers, antitrust agencies are, in fact, 
accustomed to dealing with the question of whether a firm is inher­
ently more aggressive than its rivals. According to the Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission's 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines,122 acquisition of "maverick" firms - "firms that have a 
greater economic incentive to deviate from the terms of coordination 
than do most of their rivals"123 raises particular antitrust concern. This 
is because "acquisition of a maverick firm is one way in which a 
merger may make coordinated interaction more likely, more success­
ful, or more complete. "124 
This policy statement fits in well with the point made here. The 
agencies' guidelines acknowledge that the acquisition of a maverick 
firm should be carefully scrutinized, because elimination of the mav­
erick firm (via its acquisition) might facilitate tacit collusion. This Ar­
ticle points out that the maverick firm need not be eliminated via 
complete merger for collusion to be facilitated. Rather, it is enough if 
121. See supra Section l.B. 
122. Statement Accompanying Release of Revised Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 
41,552; 41,559 (Sept. 10, 1992). 
123. Id. at 41,559-60. 
124. Id at 41,560. 
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the maverick firm credibly commits to cease being a maverick (i.e., 
commits to competing less aggressively). Passive investment by the 
maverick in a competitor serves as precisely such a commitment and 
accordingly might facilitate collusion, as would elimination of the 
maverick firm via a full merger.125 Section I.C.l.a above has further 
shown why the maverick firm might indeed want to credibly commit to 
competing less vigorously in order to reassure its competitors and pre­
vent them from competing vigorously.126 
E. Passive Investment by Controllers and Executive Compensation 
None of the cases address the special characteristics of passive in­
vestment by a firm's controller in the firm's competitor.127 From Sec­
tion I.D's analysis of passive investment by controllers flow several 
policy implications. In an industry with only a few firms, investment by 
a firm's controller in the firm's competitor should be viewed with even 
more suspicion and scrutiny than investment by the firm itself in its 
competitor. The former, as shown in Section I.D above, is potentially 
more harmful to competition and, moreover, involves no more welfare 
enhancing benefits than the latter. 
Moreover, in the case of investment by a firm's controller in the 
firm's competitor, the smaller the controller's stake in the firm it con­
trols, the larger the probable anticompetitive harm. This is because the 
smaller the controller's stake in the firm it controls, the stronger the 
controller's commitment to making its firm compete less vigorously.128 
At first blush, this last point may seem counterintuitive. One could 
theoretically put forward a technical (but incorrect) legal test that ex­
amines the degree of "linkage" between competing firms after the 
passive stock acquisition. According to such a test, there would be 
more linkage and thus, allegedly, more anticompetitive harm, when 
125. See supra Section LC.La. 
126. Recall that the maverick firm does not necessarily benefit from its inherent aggres­
siveness. Its rivals, knowing that the maverick will be aggressive, are aggressive themselves 
in the first place, in order to "strike first." 
127. See supra Section I.D. For antitrust cases in which a firm's controller invested in the 
stock of the firm's competitor, see Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. v. United States, 387 
U.S. 485 (1967); Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093 (C.D. Cal. 1979); and United States 
v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975). TCI's stake in Time Warner, discussed su­
pra note 98 and accompanying text, also is an example of passive investment by a firm's con­
troller in the firm's competitor. Medtronic's stake in SurVivaLink, discussed supra note 106 
and accompanying text, serves as an additional example. There also are at least two antitrust 
cases in which a firm's controller acquired debt in the firm's competitor: Mr. Frank, Inc. v. 
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1984); and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. 
Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In none of these cases was a distinc­
tion drawn between investment by a firm's controller in the firm's competitor and invest­
ment by the firm itself in its competitor. 
128. See supra Section l.D. 
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the controller has a larger stake in the firm it controls while possessing 
a stake in the competing firm as well. It is clear from the analysis of 
Section I.D, however, that such a test is invalid. As we have seen, the 
smaller the controller's stake in the firm it controls, the larger the anti­
competitive harm.129 
The above analysis further implies that a firm's controller, holding 
even relatively small stakes in the firm's competitor, might be substan­
tially anticompetitive. Suppose a firm's controller holds a stake in the 
firm's competitor, but the court or antitrust agency believes the level 
of this passive stake to be too small to justify intervention. Still, our 
analysis implies that the court or agency should stipulate (e.g., in a 
consent decree) that any future dilution of the controller's stake in the 
firm it controls will be subject to prior notification or approval by the 
court or agency. As Section I.D showed, even a relatively small stake 
the controller holds in a competitor may substantially harm competi­
tion if the controller's stake in the firm it controls is small enough.130 
It remains to be asked: What are the policy implications stemming 
from the analysis of components in executive compensation packages 
that are positively linked to industry or competitors' profitability? As 
Section I.D illustrated, even if antitrust laws prohibit passive invest­
ment by firms or by their controllers that may substantially harm com­
petition, firms could reach an analogous anticompetitive effect by us­
ing such compensation schemes. Hence, courts and antitrust agencies 
must be equipped to cope with such compensation schemes in order to 
effectively prevent such anticompetitive harm. 
Executive compensation schemes are clearly outside the scope of 
section 7 of the Clayton Act since they do not constitute stock or asset 
acquisitions. Additionally, they cannot constitute violations of section 
1 of the Sherman Act, which condemns anticompetitive agreements, 
since this provision requires the existence of an agreement between 
two independent parties. A compensation scheme is an intrafirm 
agreement and therefore does not fulfill this requirement.131 However, 
129. To illustrate, suppose a firm's controller invests in the firm's competitor, and, when 
attacked by an antitrust court or agency, the controller pledges to divest or dilute its holdings 
in the firm it controls (while retaining control). As the analysis demonstrates, this controller 
actually is offering not a reduction in the anticompetitive threat, but rather an exacerbation 
of this threat. 
130. Antitrust agencies very often demand prior notification or approval for an increase 
in the level of passive investment above a certain threshold. See e.g. , the consent decrees in 
Medtronic Inc., 63 Fed. Reg. 53,919 (Oct. 7, 1998); Time Warner, Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. 50,301 
(Sept. 25, 1996); United States v. Gillette Co., 1990 WL 126485 (D.D.C. July 25, 1990). These 
agencies never stipulate, however, that in the case of passive investment by controllers, fur­
ther dilution of the controller's stake in the firm it controls also is subject to prior agency 
approval. As shown in Section I.D, such dilution exacerbates the anticompetitive threat of 
passive investment just as an increase in the level of passive investment does. 
131. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 180. 
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the broad wording of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
condemning "unfair methods of competition," can capture anticom­
petitive compensation schemes. To be sure, this provision has been 
construed rather narrowly by the courts in cases where the behavior 
under attack could have benign explanations.132 Still components in 
executive compensation packages that are positively linked to industry 
or competitors' profitability are quite hard to justify unless anticom­
petitive motivations are considered.133 Accordingly, it seems plausible 
that the Federal Trade Commission could attack such compensation 
schemes, in appropriate cases, as violations of section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. 
In the case of executive compensation schemes, as with investment 
by controlling shareholders, the smaller the "stake" the manager holds 
in the firm she manages (in terms of holding the firm's stock, options, 
or components of the manager's compensation package that are posi­
tively linked to the firm's profitability) the greater the anticompetitive 
concerns. 
F. Efficiencies 
The obvious question arises whether passive investment among 
competitors, despite the anticompetitive harm that it may cause, in­
volves redeeming efficiencies. Although a conclusive investigation of 
efficiencies is beyond the scope of this Article, a few observations 
along these lines are in order. 
Clearly, efficiencies and synergies usually associated with common 
control of two merging firms do not exist with regard to passive in­
vestment. Both firms, after the investment, are managed independ­
ently, as they were before the investment. Thus, if passive investment 
does not involve other significant efficiencies, unassociated with joint 
control, there is a stronger case for condemning passive investment 
than there is for condemning full mergers. This is because, even if the 
anticompetitive effects of passive investment are weaker than those of 
a full merger, there would be no significant countervailing efficiencies 
that could deem passive investment in a competitor desirable.134 
One possible efficiency of passive investment that deserves further 
study is related to the superior information a competitor may have as 
compared to an ordinary investor. A firm's competitor is likely to have 
superior information regarding the firm, its product market, and its 
prospects. This is due to the competitor's day-to-day operation in the 
same market. Thus, passive investment by a competitor may be an ef-
132. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FfC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). 
133. See infra Section F, note 146 and accompanying text. 
134. See Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 496 (1967); 
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, § 1203 at 321; HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 498. 
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ficient way of raising capital for the firm in which the investment is 
made.135 This point can have merit, however, only under the assump­
tion that imperfect information on the part of other potential finan­
ciers makes financing by them less efficient.136 
Another possible efficiency of passive investment in a competitor 
involves profit-sharing, which may solve problems of incomplete con­
tracting and fears of opportunism between the parties.137 This point 
arises only where the investor and the firm in which the investment is 
made, in addition to being competitors, also buy something from, or 
supply something to, one another. A related point concerns the situa­
tion where one firm licenses its technology to its competitor. Licensing 
agreements have been shown to be incomplete and the licensor gener­
ally faces difficulties in appropriating the returns on its technological 
innovationY8 Investment by the technology's licensor in the licensee's 
stock may assist the licensor in appropriating these retums.139 Passive 
investment can serve such a function, however, only if the stock is 
granted free of charge or for a disproportionately low price. If the 
price paid for the acquired stock equals the expected profit that the 
stock brings, passive investment cannot assist in appropriating the re­
turns from innovation. Whatever the licensor receives through passive 
investment in the licensee's stock, it has to pay ex ante when acquiring 
the stock. 
Finally, passive investment may involve efficiencies in the alloca­
tion of production among firms. That is, it may cause more efficient 
firms to produce more of the industry's output, while causing less effi­
cient firms to produce less of the industry's output.140 Such an effi-
135. It should be noted that this efficiency exists, if at all, only in cases where the firm in 
which the investment is made issues new stock in exchange for the investment and thus uses 
the investment to actually raise capital. If the investor purchases existing stock from existing 
shareholders, capital clearly is not raised by the firm, and the question of efficiencies in 
raising capital does not arise. 
136. Passive investment in a competitor may also be argued to be a form of risk diversi­
fication for the acquirer of the stock. Greater diversification, however, readily can be 
achieved without passive investment in a competitor by investment in a diversified portfolio, 
which does not involve anticompetitive harm. 
137. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE ch. 2 (1995). 
138. See Richard E. Caves et al., The Imperfect Market for Technology Licenses, 45 
OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 249 (1983). 
139. There is statistical evidence that, in the case of international licensing agreements, 
many licensors report returns from investment in the licensee's stock as a considerable por­
tion of their total returns from licensing. See ENID BAIRD LOVELL, APPRAISING FOREIGN 
LICENSING PERFORMANCE (1969); ROBERT W. WILSON, THE SALE OF TECHNOLOGY 
THROUGH LICENSING, Reproduced by National Technical Information Service, U.S. De­
partment of Commerce 27 (1975). 
140. Although the claim of countervailing efficiencies in production allocation is valid 
from a welfare point of view, it is not clear to what extent courts and antitrust agencies take 
such efficiencies into account when assessing a transaction such as a merger or a passive in­
vestment. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, for example, do not specifically cite improved allocation of production 
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ciency is most likely to arise when a less efficient (high-cost) firm in­
vests in the stock of a more efficient (low-cost) firm. As explained in 
the analysis of Section LB, when there is no ongoing collusion in the 
industry, a high-cost firm that has invested in a low-cost firm's stock 
will reduce its output. In some cases, the low-cost firm reacts to this 
reduction of output by an expansion of its own output. Here, although 
aggregate output in the industry is reduced as a result of passive in­
vestment,141 the allocation of output becomes more efficient.142 The 
high-cost firm produces less of the industry's output, while the low­
cost firm produces more of this output.143 
When a low-cost firm invests in the stock of a high-cost firm, how­
ever, the claim of countervailing efficiencies in the allocation of pro­
duction becomes doubtful. Under the assumption that firms react to 
their competitor's reduction of output by an expansion of their own 
output, investment in the stock of the high-cost firm by the low-cost 
firm brings less efficient allocation of production. The low-cost firm 
will reduce output (due to its investment in the high-cost firm) and the 
high-cost firm will react by expanding its output. Thus, due to such 
passive investment, not only is total industry output · reduced, 144 but 
also more of the industry's output will be produced by the less effi­
cient, high-cost, firm.145 
In the case of components in executive compensation packages 
that are positively linked to industry or competitors' profits, it is diffi­
cult to find welfare-enhancing benefits. Generally, we would expect to 
find components in an executive's compensation package that are 
positively linked to the profits of the firm she manages, since this will 
induce the manager to exert efforts to maximize the value of the firm. 
There is no obvious efficiency-enhancing virtue to including compo­
nents in the manager's compensation package that are positively 
linked to industry or competitors' profitability.146 It is true that there 
as one of the efficiencies to be considered in assessing a merger. 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,562 
(Sept. 10, 1992). 
141. See supra Section LB, note 28 and accompanying text. 
142. This was shown, in a formal model by Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 44. 
143. This result is much less clear in cases where the low-cost firm reacts to the high-cost 
firm's reduction in output by reducing its own output. See supra note 27. Still, the same claim 
of increased efficiency of output allocation may continue to hold if it can be shown, in a par­
ticular case, that the low-cost firm will reduce output by less than the high-cost firm. 
144. See Section LB, note 28 and accompanying text. 
145. The analysis is more complex if the high-cost firm reacts to the low-cost firm's re­
duced quantity by itself reducing quantity. See supra note 27. If the high-cost firm reduces 
quantity by more than the low-cost firm reduced quantity, passive investment would involve 
a countervailing efficiency in production allocation. 
146. An exception is the above-mentioned efficiency connected to improved allocation 
of production. If the manager of a high-cost firm, for example, has a compensation package 
with components that are positively linked to a low-cost rival's performance, the manager 
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are cases in which it is not optimal for the manager's compensation to 
be strongly related to the firm's performance, because such compensa­
tion exposes the manager to risk.147 However, a more direct way to 
avoid such exposure to risk would be not to add components to the 
manager's compensation package that are positively linked to industry 
or competitors' performance, but rather to make compensation 
schemes less dependent on the firm's own profits.148 
G. Remedies 
In cases where passive investment may substantially lessen compe­
tition, the only effective remedy is divestiture of the acquired stock. A 
decree aimed at merely restricting conduct, short of divestiture, would 
be unfeasible. Many of the decrees seen in the case law were meant to 
assure the court that the acquirer of the stock would not use its owner­
ship of the stock to influence the behavior of the firm in which the in­
vestment was made, elect a board member, vote, obtain sensitive in­
formation, etc.149 All that such a decree provides is that the acquirer of 
the stock remain a-passive investor. Such a decree obviously does not 
prevent the anticompetitive harm caused by passive stock acquisitions. 
Moreover, it would be very difficult to enforce a decree according 
to which the firms would refrain from anticompetitive conduct, such as 
tacit collusion. Since tacit collusion is hard to detect or prevent, such a 
decree would tend to be ineffective. This point is even stronger when 
one considers the anticompetitive effects of passive investment that 
exist without ongoing collusion.150 These effects (higher prices and 
lower output) involve unilateral pricing and output decisions that can-
will tend to produce less, and the allocation of production efficiencies discussed above might 
become relevant. 
147. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 28, at 35. 
148. To be sure, if a manager's compensation package has components that are posi­
tively linked to the firm's own profits (such as the firm's stock or options) as well as compo­
nents that are positively linked to competitors' profitability, some of the risk the manager 
would have to bear from the first components would be canceled out by the latter. For ex­
ample, the risk that the firm would lose business to its competitors due to a change in the 
tastes of consumers would cancel out, since the firm would earn less (reducing the first 
above-mentioned components of compensation), but competitors would earn more (raising 
the second components of compensation). However, under such a compensation scheme, the 
manager would still have to bear some of the risks that the whole industry faces, such as a 
general decrease in demand for the product, an increase in the costs of raw materials, and so 
on. 
149. See Medtronic, Inc., 63 Fed. Reg. 53,919-20 (Oct. 7, 1998); Time Warner, Inc., 61 
Fed. Reg. 50,301 (Sept. 25, 1996); United States v. Gillette Co., 1990 WL 126485 (D.D.C. 
July 25, 1990); United States v. Gillette Co., 55 Fed. Reg. 28,312 (July 10, 1990); United 
States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Anaconda Co. v. 
Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch 
Co., 114 F. Supp. 307, 316 (D. Conn. 1953), affd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) . 
150. See supra Section l.B. 
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not, and should not,151 be monitored by courts or agencies on an on­
going basis.152 
Not only is divestiture the only effective remedy in the case of anti­
competitive passive investment, it is also much less complicated to im­
plement than in the case of mergers that violate section 7 of the Clay­
ton Act.153 All that is needed to implement divestiture of a passive 
stock acquisition is to issue an order to sell the stock. When the stock 
is publicly traded, such an order seems relatively easy to implement. 
When the stock is not publicly traded, divestiture is more difficult, but 
still usually far less complex than divestiture is in the complete merger 
case.154 
In the same vein, it can be stated that there is only one way to 
avoid the anticompetitive effect of components in executive compen­
sation packages that are positively linked to industry or competitors' 
profitability: annulment of such components.155 It was shown above 
how such components in compensation packages induce managers to 
manage their firms less competitively. As discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs, it would be impossible to prevent this result effectively by 
issuing decrees that order managers to compete more vigorously. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article implies that even though Gillette's stake in Wilkinson 
Sword, TCI's stake in Time Warner, and Microsoft's stake in Apple, 
are merely passive, we might be paying more, and getting less, for ra­
zor blades, cable TV, cable programming, and computer operating sys­
tems precisely because of those passive stakes. The anticompetitive ef­
fects predicted in the Article are probabilistic in nature. But so are the 
anticompetitive effects feared in full-blown mergers. In the case of 
passive investment, as in the case of horizontal mergers, antitrust is 
ideally aimed at preventing potential anticompetitive harm, since ac­
tual anticompetitive harm, in such transactions, is extremely hard to 
prove in court. 
In a market with only a few firms, even totally passive investment 
by a firm in its competitor may substantially harm competition. Even 
151. If courts had to monitor unilateral pricing and output decisions, they would turn 
into de facto price regulators. 
152. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
153. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, at 323. 
154. Furthermore, with a clear rule stating that an anticompetitive passive stock acquisi­
tion would lead to divestiture, such passive stock acquisitions would be less likely to occur to 
begin with. 
155. Particularly, the Federal Trade Commission, through section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994), could order the firm, in appropriate cases, 
to stop including such components in its executive compensation packages. 
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when firms are not colluding, passive investment will raise prices. Fur­
thermore, passive investment can be strategically used to facilitate 
tacit or express collusion, particularly when the investor is a maverick 
firm. The investment strategically commits the investor to becoming a 
less vigorous competitor in order to induce rivals to compete less vig­
orously themselves. When it is a firm's controller that invests in the 
firm's competitor, the smaller the controller's stake in the firm it con­
trols, the stronger these anticompetitive effects become. Moreover, 
the anticompetitive effect can be replicated by including in executive 
compensation packages components that are positively linked to in­
dustry or competitors' profitability. 
Accordingly, the recent decisions on the part of antitrust agencies 
not to challenge pronounced cases of passive investment are unjusti­
fied. Equally unwarranted is the leading cases' interpretation of the 
"solely for investment" exemption, which has been shown here to 
grant passive investment a de facto exemption. This Article advocates 
a different legal approach - one that takes into account the anti-com­
petitive effect of passive investment. 
